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Mr. Big operations are a complex undercover investigative technique used to collect evidence on 
a suspect with limited evidence to press charges. The particular circumstances and very nature of 
a Mr. Big operation has led to considerable criticism regarding the difficulty of law enforcement 
being able to balance their independence and oversight concerning the rights of the accused.  
Furthermore, significant officer discretion is required.  Various investigative strategies that are 
used in Mr. Big operations, from threatening the suspect, false presentations of evidence, untrue 
promises and enticements, alongside the complete alteration of reality, have demonstrated the 
possibility of severe police misconduct. These tactics undeniably raise concerns pertaining to the 
reliability of the evidence such as, if the confession was coerced, involuntary, or if the impact of 
these aggressive or enticing tactics could lead the suspect to confess falsely. Such techniques 
engage the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 7 and section 11(d), based on the 
fundamental principles of justice; these afforded legal rights are engaged to help protect the 
accused from an unreasonable state intrusion. The unique engagement of these rights and Mr. 
Big Operations has been addressed in the landmark case of R v Hart [2014], with a new 
common-law rule for addressing the reliability and protections of the accused. However, there is 
still a prominent lack of oversight and guidance in which there is vast opportunity for harmful 
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Mr. Big Operations and the Charter 
 
“Mr. Big operations” are an undercover investigative technique used in cases where there 
is a lack of evidence required to charge an individual with a crime. Mr. Big represents a 
hypothetical crime boss of a criminal syndicate that recruits the accused with the intention of 
collecting a confession or further evidence. In actual fact, Mr. Big is an undercover police officer 
engaged in an investigation that has, as its goal, the production of a confession. However, these 
investigations are often subjected to criticism and debate as these operations hold elements that 
risk the possibility of an unreliable or false confession occurring. In upholding the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the rights of the accused must be protected in these 
investigations. Tactics such as unreasonable probing, inducements, threats, and violence, may 
intrude ones right to silence, right to security of the person, their presumption of innocence, and 
the right not to make self-incriminating statements. Over time, there have been a considerable 
number of Mr. Big cases that have been appealed and brought to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC) where Supreme Court justices must consider the admissibility of evidence obtained 
through this undercover technique as they risk posing an unreasonable infringement on the 
suspect’s s.7 or s.11(d) Charter rights. Therefore, making the confession or other evidence 
collected in the covert investigation inadmissible and would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute.  
Research Question 
 
The research question that will be analyzed in this project asks Do Mr. Big Police 
operations engage a suspect’s rights concerning section.7 and section.11(d) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms? There is concern that evidence obtained through this technique 
can infringe a suspect's s.7 or s.11(d) Charter rights. Law enforcement officers are provided 
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appropriate legal protection to engage in deceptive behaviour to solve serious crimes. However, 
one must consider section 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that obliges law 
enforcement authorities to “respect all exigencies of the Charter and precludes improperly 
obtained evidence from being admitted when it impinges on the fairness of the trial” (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c11 s 24(2)). It is crucial to examine this question in order to 
identify and determine the extent to which tactics can be used in undercover investigations as 
police lies, manipulation, and tricks are discouraged to protect the integrity of the police's 
investigation and ethical reliability respecting an individual’s rights. For example, in cases where 
Mr. Big operations were used, there is a common theme where judges determined coercion and 
entrapment had occurred, placing the suspect in unreasonable circumstances, often causing false 
confessions or inadmissible evidence. Mr. Big Operations are still being used as an investigative 
strategy today. It is vital to identify the boundaries within these tactics to ensure Charter rights 
are protected to the fullest extent to limit miscarriages of justice in the Canadian criminal justice 
system.   
Methodology 
 
This qualitative analysis aims to describe and clarify the tactics and limitations of 
undercover Mr. Big police operations regarding Charter implications. The research design for 
this analysis is a mixed-method design that will be “drawing on backgrounds in both the social 
sciences and law to carry out this research” (Keenan, & Brockman, 2010, p.27). This analysis 
will consist of a case study design and a systematic review design to guide and structure the 
found research. Using this interpretive framework will bring forth thoughtful discussion from 
findings and generate new understandings and perspectives surrounding the use of Mr. Big 
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Operations, along with the implications they can impose and the risk of a ‘targets’ Charter rights 
being unreasonably infringed (USC Libraries, 2020, Mixed Methods Design). The mixed-
method design is valuable to this qualitative study as it allows the exhaustive collection of a 
variety of evidence to support the conclusion (USC Libraries, 2020, Mixed Methods Design). 
Through the case study design, Supreme Court of Canada cases will be used to identify specific 
cases in which Mr. Big Operations were used, bringing judicial insight around circumstances in 
which charter rights are unreasonably or reasonably infringed (USC Libraries, 2020, Case Study 
Design). The specific cases that will be discussed include R v Hart [2014], R v Mack [1988], and 
R v Mack [2014]. The cases of R v Oickle [2000], R v Herbert [1990], and R v Sinclair [2010] 
will also be examined regarding the “confession rule” and the right to remain silent to bring 
understanding to the police and legal guidelines in obtaining confessions. Using case study 
design in this way will contribute to the analysis by providing evidence and rulings from 
precedent cases. Using a systematic review design will allow for definition and exploration of 
the existing research and criticism around the use of Mr. Big Operations through secondary 
research such as peer-reviewed journal articles (USC Libraries, 2020, Systematic Review).   
Variables that will be addressed are the investigations where Mr. Big Police Operations 
were used, as well as the Charter rights s.7 and s.11(d) to measure if these investigations engage 
charter rights and if such engagement could be saved under s.24(2). The specific operational 
search terms I will be using pertain to “Mr. Big,” “Mr. Big Police Operations,” “Big Boss,” 
“Undercover Crime Boss,” “criticisms of Mr. Big,” “Confession Trilogy,” Infringement, section 
7 and section 11 of the Charter, “RCMP and Mr. Big,” and others. Through this unobtrusive 
method, pre-existing documents such as journal articles, scholarly publications, and statistics will 
be analyzed to provide broader coverage, evidence and knowledge around the topic; the 
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inclusion of SCC cases and news articles for data sources (Van Den Hoonaard, 2015, p.126). To 
ensure data is being retrieved from reliable sources and is a high-quality source, databases from 
the Mount Royal University Library, scholarly sources that the library subscribes to, and other 
library resources that librarians have reviewed will be used in search of information (Del Balso, 
& Lewis, 2011, p. 49). Using these library sources makes research material convenient and 
reliable (Del Balso, & Lewis, 2011, p.51). Scholarly online information sources, including 
multidisciplinary databases, will be searched (Del Balso, & Lewis, 2011, p.51). Databases that 
will be used are EBSCOhost, PROQUEST, SpringerLink Journals, and CRKN Wiley Online 
Library (Mount Royal University, n.d., Databases). Legal Databases such as CanLII, Criminal 
Justice Database, and JSTOR will also be searched along with government websites such as 
Statistics Canada and RCMP websites. Once the raw data has been collected from these sources, 
data will be assessed through content analysis to answer the research question. Content analysis 
is a flexible method for examining raw text data and allows for a descriptive and interpretive 
framework to be incorporated into this project (Hsieh, & Shannon, 2005, p.1277). This project 
will follow the more direct content analysis and extend the existing research on Mr. Big police 
operations. Directing focus on determining if these operations unreasonably infringe charter 
rights (Hsieh, & Shannon, 2005, p.1281). This methodology provides an opportunity to critically 
evaluate and analyze data to explore the research question exhaustively, allowing for findings to 
be synthesized, guiding the analysis of whether Mr. Big Operations reasonably or unreasonably 
infringe a suspect's Charter rights (USC Libraries, 2020, Systematic Review).  
Limitations 
 
Possible limitations of the research design are predominantly concerned with the 
exhaustiveness of the research. This is because every case that has used the undercover technique 
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of Mr. Big will not be able to be examined due to the fact that not every case that appears before 
the judiciary will be entered into a database. For example, it is common for cases where the 
accused enters a guilty plea to be excluded from these databases unless a sentencing decision is 
published (Keenan, & Brockman, 2010, p.28). There are also cases where Mr. Big Operations 
tactics were used in an investigation but may actually be labeled as something other than “Mr. 
Big” as in Quebec they are often referred to as “l’opèration d’infiltration” and “un(e) agent(e) 
d’infiltration” in which they would be missed in the collection of data (Keenan, & Brockman, 
2010, p.27). This means that it will not be possible to examine every single Mr. Big case that has 
occurred for the case study design and analysis, thus limiting the scope of this study. This also 
speaks to the notion that no two Mr. Big cases are the same, there are often similar tactics, 
approaches, and target profiles when comparing Mr. Big cases, but there are differences in terms 
of how investigations play out and the collection of evidence which can pose mild challenges in 
drawing complete connections and conclusions from the relationships of various Mr. Big 
Investigations. Outside of the content specifically, limitations can often be personal factors such 
as age, experience, background, or even gender, but as a young woman who is aware of 
privilege, discrimination, and biases that are present in society and law enforcement, the author 
of this project must remain mindful in how the information is managed (Hoonaard, 2015, p.46). 
When using content analysis, one must also be mindful of presentism when researching data and 
studying cases due to changing laws and standards that occur over time (Hoonaard, 2015, p.68). 
Lastly, a minor limitation of this study is that there are no recent statistics on Mr. Big police 
operations and their usage in Canada. This is not an oversight of the RCMP as they are simply 
unable to collect statistics on all their investigations, but this does place some limitation on the 
exploration of the popularity or usage of Mr. Big operations in Canada. 
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Defining and Explaining a Mr. Big Operation 
 
Mr. Big is a Canadian undercover investigation technique developed by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in British Columbia in the early 1900s. The first Mr. Big case 
in Canada was not all that successful, being referred to as “vile, base, and contemptible” by the 
Crown due to questions around the admissibility of a confession (Keenan, & Brockman, 2010, p. 
17). However, since then this investigative technique has become more advanced and has been 
used widely by the RCMP, the most recent reliable statistics pertaining to the use of Mr. Big 
operations can be found from 2008 from the RCMP reports that they had carried out 350 Mr. Big 
sting operations in Canada with a 75% success rate; meaning the outcome of the investigation 
resulted in obtaining a confession or that a suspect was cleared from the investigation 
(Holmgren, 2017, p.159). Within this sample, the RCMP reported a 95% conviction rate when 
able to gain a confession from the suspect that was admissible in court (Holmgren, 2017, p.159). 
Although this is a positive statistic to reflect the use and the “success” of the operation in 
Canada, it only addresses the outcome of using the technique, this does not provide a complete 
assessment of the process in how a successful outcome is achieved. Mr. Big operations can be a 
beneficial technique for law enforcement to rely on. However, due to creatively fashioned 
interrogation techniques that allow for discretion within very nature of undercover investigations 
they often have elements of coercion and deception in the pre-custody interrogations. There are 
considerable questions around the operations credibility and reliability in obtaining confessions 
that lead to “successful” convictions (Keenan, et al., 2010, p.17). Thus, opening the door for 
criticism, critique, and a demand for oversight.  
To provide background context, this is considered to be a last resort technique for cases 
that have gone cold or where law enforcement strongly suspects someone of committing a crime 
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but has been unable to obtain any effective physical evidence to file a charge (Milward, 2013, 
p.81). This is a covert investigative technique because of the wide range of investigative 
activities that fall under the umbrella of undercover investigations (Holmgren, 2017, p.154).  
However, this technique differs from other kinds of undercover tactics because the officers 
actually build an alternate environment by creating an entire ‘fake’ criminal organization 
syndicate. Officers do this with the intent of building a relationship with the suspect to collect the 
necessary confession and other incriminating evidence that is believed to be involved in the 
crime under investigation. Evidence collected allows police to formally charge a suspect and put 
them before the courts. According to Keenan and Brockman (2010), a Mr. Big scenario can be 
explained as a number of undercover police officers who adopt fictitious criminal personas and 
pose as crime figures, like gang members that are a part of a criminal organization in order to 
deceive a target (suspect of said crime) into believing they are being initiated and conditioned to 
join said criminal syndicate under the direction of the boss, Mr. Big. (Keenan, et al., 2010, p.19). 
The investigation is essentially built on the premise of deceiving the suspect into believing he is 
being conditioned to join this successful criminal organization in which his initiation into this 
syndicate requires him to confess to his past crimes to “Mr. Big” (Holmgren, 2017, p. 152). It 
has been said that the RCMP have perfected the backdrop that stimulates a “real-world criminal 
environment” in which agents become swiftly intertwined directly and surreptitiously with the 
criminal world projecting the fantasy making it nearly impossible for a target to differentiate to 
reality (Keenan, et al., 2010, p.19).  
The Process of a Mr. Big Operation 
 
To further explain, Mr. Big police operations can be broken down into a 4-stage process 
of intelligence probe, introduction, credibility-building and evidence gathering. During the 
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intelligence probe police officers will conduct surveillance on the target to obtain information 
about his friends, family, employment, lifestyle, hobbies, where free time is spent, routine, etc. 
(Luther, & Snook, 2016, p.132). This prepares the officers for the next stage of introduction so 
that they may tailor their approach, behaviours, and attitudes to best match those of the target 
(Luther, & Snook, 2016, p.132).  This will also help to prepare them for their interactions and 
develop interactive scenarios prior to befriending the target (Keenan et al., 2010, p.19). 
Researchers like Poloz (2015) emphasize the importance in this preparation as he suggests that 
the fundamental success of a Mr. Big operation lies within the architecture of “establishing a 
deliberate and disproportionate degree of psychological and emotional control over the accused” 
(Luther, & Snook, 2016, p.232).   
As for the introduction stage, an undercover officer will likely make contact with the 
target while in police custody by the means of a third party or by attempting to recruit them 
through their attendance at rehabilitation facilities, or their place of employment (Luther, & 
Snook, 2016, p.132).  The introduction consists of an undercover officer befriending the target 
and introducing them to the fictitious criminal organization (Luther, & Snook, 2016, p.132). 
After making contact with the target the officers will then engage in the credibility-building stage 
by working to gain the targets trust through means of cash, sexual enticements, and 
drugs/alcohol. The undercover operatives involve targets in fake criminal acts to give the 
appearance of a real criminal syndicate; for instance, there could be physical assaults, drug 
trafficking, mafia-style executions, picking up and dropping off parcels, counting large sums of 
money, collecting unpaid debts, dealing with firearms, and the appearance of money laundering 
all to demonstrate power and legitimacy (Puddister, & Riddell, 2012, p.386). This stage is crucial 
to the success of the investigation as it is essential for the undercover officers to build a rapport 
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and trust in this carefully structured relationship in order to be in a plausible position to obtain a 
confession from the target (Keenan, et al., 2010, p.19). The undercover officers introduce the 
suspect to this “gang lifestyle” over several weeks or months by involving them in minor crimes, 
payment for criminal activities, and by displaying evidence of wealth (Smith Stinson, & Patry, 
2009, p.170). This can be also be viewed as a bonding and grooming process as the officers take 
the target on a range of crimes and activities from watching strippers, attending hockey games, 
going to bars, discussing sexual exploits, and other various scenarios created by the officers to 
establish ‘friendship’ and credit to the criminal enterprise this target is being recruited into 
(Keenan, et al., 2010, p. 20).  
Lastly, is the evidence gathering stage where the target it introduced to “Mr. Big” and the 
officers work to obtain a confession and additional evidence that becomes crucial at trial in 
convincing the suspect of the serious crime they are accused of. It is only once trust is solidified 
that the target will be introduced to Mr. Big who will demand absolute truth and honesty from 
the target about previous crimes (the offense in question) in order to establish credibility, loyalty 
and to protect the criminal organization against future problems or surprises (Puddister, & 
Riddell, 2012, p.386). Mr. Big is portrayed to the target as an all-powerful individual who has 
connections in the criminal underworld as well as reliable police resources and other justice 
officials in his pocket so that the target feels comfortable opening up (Keenan, et al., p.20).  
The fictional crime boss works to get the confession during a covertly taped sit down 
with the target and telling them that their honesty regarding the offense in question is mandatory 
in order for them to be able to join the organization or for them to be helped by Mr. Big (Keenan, 
et al., 2010, p.20) (Poloz, 2015, p.234). For example, Mr. Big could tell the target that he will 
help him avoid criminal prosecution if he is honest about his involvement with the criminal 
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investigation at hand. This stage puts pressure on undercover operatives to ethically follow the 
legal guidelines established for them in how they should obtain a confession. Therefore, officers 
must be extremely cautious in terms of “how they articulate the demands of honesty, trust, 
dependability, and loyalty as requirements of the suspects membership” to the organization, as 
the wrong moves can result in entrapment, coercion, false confessions and unreasonably 
infringed rights of the target (Keenan, et al., 2010, p.20). It is due to these unique tactics Mr. Big 
Operations call for guidelines and oversight to ensure due process and rights of a target are 
upheld. 
Criticisms of Mr. Big Operations 
Since the early 1900’s, Mr. Big investigations have seen success, as Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) Justice Moldaver said in the landmark R v Hart [2014] decision, the technique has 
proven to be an effective investigative tool resulting in many convictions of cases that would 
have likely gone unsolved, but the technique “comes with a price” (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, 
p.4-5). These investigations have become scrutinized and questioned for their tactics and ethics 
as the target is expected to confess to Mr. Big during a non-custodial situation with often 
“pointed interrogations and sometimes veiled threats” which leads to the rising speculation that 
these investigations produce unreliable confessions (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.5). Mr. Big 
operations are often scrutinized due to their cost, secrecy (lack of public knowledge), the difficult 
balance between police independence and oversight as these tactics demand un-biased officers 
with capable discretion, and the fact there is an increased potential for false confessions and 
wrongful convictions (Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p.385). As well as the ethical and legal issues 
regarding the protection of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms section.7 and the right to silence, 
s.11’s presumption of innocence, the applicability of the law in determining the voluntariness of 
the confession, and if the tactics used are paramount to abuse of process or police trickery 
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(Keenan, et al., 2013, p.67). Mr. Big operations have begun to raise three distinct concerns, 
prejudice, reliability, and potential for police misconduct (Holmgren, 2017, p.155). The 
questionable salient features being referred to are found in the implied threats of violence, 
repeated confrontations with suspects with allegations of their guilt, false presentations of 
evidence, and the untrue promise of “making the problem go away” (Milard, 2013, p.106).  
These concerns address the reliability of information, the shadows of entrapment, and the 
potential for coercion (Murphy, & Anderson, 2016, p. 30).  
Although these tactics are considered necessary to deliver the alternate environment, this 
technique neglects the protections of an in-custody interrogation and gives officers great power 
to exercise discretion; leaving officers with the ability to freely apply confrontational tactics to 
obtain a confession (Milard, 2013, p.110). Although, we see the RCMP claims a 75% success 
rate with the Mr. Big investigative techniques, little is known about its “failures” (Smith, et al., 
2009, p.172). Speaking to the cases where the target was investigated but found innocent, was 
wrongfully convicted, or had evidence ruled inadmissible (Smith, et al., 2009, p.172).  
With that being said, some researchers hold the argument that the techniques of Mr. Big 
operations are a serious intrusion into citizen privacy and create the breeding ground for false 
confessions and unethical behavior to produce a guilty outcome (Milward, 2013, p.82). Thus, 
pointing to the secrecy and the salient features within the operation that should require the 
oversight and regulation by the SCC to scrutinize and assess the reliability of this technique 
(Milward, 2013, p.82). Kouri Keenan, a consult and expert on Mr. Big investigative tactics, 
explains that the details surrounding this technique are often shrouded in secrecy because the 
success and nature of this investigation is dependent on the undercover work, revealing this 
information would make this carefully developed technique essentially less effective (Holmgren, 
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2017, p.151). Although Mr. Keenan recognizes the classified nature of this undercover work 
being essential to the technique’s success, he warns that the restricted access about how the 
RCMP conduct these Mr. Big investigations can prevent oversight and public scrutiny; for the 
presence of secrecy in any govern organization can create the opportunity for abuse of power and 
ultimately threaten our Charter rights (Keenan et al., 2013, p.21). Therefore, one must consider 
what errors fall and are hidden within this secrecy. This indirectly leads to another concern that 
the legal system has difficulty balancing police independence in conducting their investigations 
with the necessary accountability and oversight. Law enforcement must remain independent 
without the government having too much control over police operations as this would disrupt 
citizen’s independent bureaucracy and the legitimacy of policing.  
The personal biases that law enforcement officers also carry can greatly influence the 
process of the Mr. Big investigation and the interrogation. For instance, officers who hold a 
“guilt presumptive” state of mind, meaning they believe and expect the suspect to be guilty, are 
more likely to ask guilt presumptive questions, use more techniques to try to get the target to 
confess, and often exert more pressure on suspects which often results in them becoming anxious 
which displays itself as “suspicious behavior” (Smith, et al., 2009, p.181). This guilty 
presumptive framework is especially worrisome as it can negatively influence the operations 
success and infringe on the suspects s.11(d) Charter rights by not presuming them innocent until 
proven otherwise in a court of law (Smith, et al., 2009, p.180). The operatives are also 
scrutinized as it often appears that “when the courts impose restrictions on what police officers 
can do in order to enhance reliability or protect the constitutional rights of the accused, the police 
seem to find another procedure to bypass the rules” in order to obtain their evidence (Keenan et 
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al., 2013, p.32). The inability to be sure of officer bias and their ability to navigate oversight 
creates room for criticism as a great deal of discretion is placed in the officer’s hands.  
Another structural criticism of these operations lies in the financial burden and manpower that 
Mr. Big operations require (Puddister, & Riddell, 2012, p.390).  For example, one Mr. Big 
operation alone may utilize as many as 50 police operatives and cost upwards of a million dollars 
or more as they can extend from months to even a year (Luther, & Snook, 2016, p.133). This 
places a great burden on law enforcement agencies and the justice system. 
Producing False Confessions  
Lastly, a vital criticism of Mr. Big operations is that they may produce false confessions, 
often leading to wrongful convictions, this can happen through the salient means discussed 
above. Past literature on wrongful convictions identifies police-induced false confessions as one 
of the leading factors and causes for wrongful convictions today, with roughly 12% of 
incarcerated criminals self-report that they falsely confessed to police (Smith, et al., 2009, 
p.180). It is not all that uncommon for someone who is not guilty of a crime to plead guilty in 
court once consulting counsel; therefore, it is not unreasonable to consider that innocent targets 
in Mr. Big operations may confess to crimes they did not commit given the circumstances 
(Keenan, 2013, p.32). For instance, the targets may overestimate their participation and 
culpability in the crime in question and create stories of previous misdemeanors or add ‘details’ 
to portray themselves as worthy candidates to join the criminal organization or impress the crime 
boss, Mr. Big (Keenan, 2013, p.47).  They may also confess in order to escape the intense 
situation with Mr. Big or to gain the perceived reward that Mr. Big is offering (Smith, et al., 
2009, p.180). After all, it is clear that the pressure on a target to confess in this evidence 
gathering is substantial. It is evident through the examination of prior cases that the offers of 
20 
 
leniency or various benefits or gain, using threats of harm, or quid pro quos are casual links to 
false confessions and thus wrongful convictions (Smith, et al., 2009, p.180). 
This is not to mention that another crucial factor is the target’s age and mental capacity 
(such as intellectually disadvantaged or mental illness). These two vulnerability factors can 
increase the likelihood of suspects falsely confessing, in which these factors in combination with 
Mr. Big tactics are more likely to produce false confessions from the target (Keenan, 2013, p.41). 
In summary, Mr. Big operations often have elements that can lead to an individual to falsely 
confess. Based on the very principle of the operation, a target may be seeking advantage, 
acceptance, or street credibility, or the avoid negative consequences; all while being placed 
under pressure unaware of the police presence. Which can lead to an individual to falsely 
confess. Therefore, the circumstances of Mr. Big may be viewed as unethical as they undermine 
the reliability of the confession and increase the chance of an innocent person confessing to a 
crime they did not commit (Keenan, 2013, p.47).  
Mr. Big Operations and Entrapment 
 
In Canadian law, entrapment occurs when a government agent such as a law enforcement 
officer induces someone to commit an illegal act that they would not have otherwise committed 
(Smith, et al., 2009, p.179).  Entrapment can be defined as the “conception and planning of an 
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have 
perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of officer” (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 
903, I. The Context). Entrapment can then be used as a criminal defense based on the interaction 
between police officers and the defendant. In other words, this defense may be allowed in court 
when someone has been “set up” or “trapped into committing a crime by police or police 
informants (Barnhorst, & Barnhorst, 2013, p.87). The defense of entrapment would be a specific 
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application to the doctrine of abuse process. This would be the conviction of a person who had 
been entrapped into committing an offense which brings the administration of justice into dispute 
and would violate the values of the Charter and principles of fundamental justice (Stewart, 2012, 
p. 268). This is often what people assume happens under the influence of an undercover 
operation like Mr. Big. 
R v Mack [1988] 
The SCC case of R v Mack [1988] defined and discussed the issue of entrapment in great 
detail. The SCC justices had to consider the specific threshold limits in which police misconduct 
such as entrapment could be considered exceeding their reach of the permissible common law 
limits (Keenan, 2013, p.36). As seen in other precedents the threshold to determine an abuse of 
process by the police such as entrapment is quite high; with the complex variables at play in Mr. 
Big investigations guidance and scrutiny is needed from the SCC to protect society (Puddister, & 
Riddell, 2012, p.395).  
Mr. Mack was charged with unlawful possession of narcotics for the purpose of 
trafficking, but at the end of his trial his defense brought an application for a stay of proceedings 
on the basis of entrapment (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, The Facts). Mr. Mack said that the 
individual who was a police undercover informer repeatedly asked to sell him drugs in person 
and via phone calls. Mr. Mack refused to do so on multiple occasions until the undercover officer 
threatened him and told him “to get his act together” when he did not provide the requested 
drugs, he then eventually agreed to sell the narcotics (Barnhorst, & Barnhorst, 2013, p.87).  The 
appellant held that the police were not interrupting an ongoing criminal act but rather brought 
about a conduct that wouldn’t have occurred without their involvement (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 
903, p.13). Therefore, the police were seen to be going further than merely providing an 
opportunity to commit an offense (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, p.13). The stay of proceedings 
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application at the first trial was refused and a conviction was entered, a notice of appeal was then 
filed with the BC Court of Appeal, but it was dismissed. The case was appealed to the SCC who 
allowed the appeal and officially determined that entrapment exists as a part of the abuse of 
process doctrine (Barnhorst, & Barnhorst, 2013, p.87). 
It is expected that police conduct is to be directed at obtaining evidence when an offense 
is committed, but the tactics that involve questionable conduct that violate Charter rights cannot 
be tolerated. In order to determine entrapment, there must be a critical distinction between the 
police acting on a reasonable suspicion in the pursuit of a criminal investigation and providing 
the suspect with the opportunity to commit a crime, and the state actually creating a crime for the 
purpose of prosecuting said individual (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, I. The Context). Canadian 
Supreme Court Justice Willard Estey (as he was known then) explains that entrapment occurs 
when the authorities (a) provide an opportunity to persons to commit an offence without 
reasonable suspicion or, (b) have a reasonable suspicion and are acting in the course of a bona 
fide inquiry but then go beyond merely providing an opportunity and induce the suspect into the 
commission of an offense (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, IV. The Proper Approach).  Some 
inducements that law enforcement include deceit, fraud, trickery, a reward, or calculated 
inveigling and persistent importuning (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, IV. The Proper Approach).  
To determine whether the police have employed means which go beyond providing an 
opportunity, the trial judge will consider factors such as the type of crime being investigated, 
whether the average person in the position of the accused would be induced into the commission 
of the crime, the accused’s resistance and number of attempts made by the police, type of 
inducement, whether the police contact was exploitative, among other factors (R v Mack, [1988] 
2 SCR 903, Summary). Therefore, if the trial judge decides there was entrapment from law 
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enforcement, it means the evidence obtained violated the Charter, thus bringing the 
administration of justice in disrepute (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, p.8).  
In determining whether the doctrine of entrapment applies to the appeal of R v Mack 
[1988], the SCC found that the police did entrap the suspect as it did not appear to be an 
interruption of an ongoing criminal enterprise, the offense was clearly brought about by their 
conduct, and they exploited Mr. Mack’s narcotic addiction (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, 
Summary).The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside and entered a stay of 
proceedings (R v Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903, Summary).  
Therefore, a target of a Mr. Big operation could be entrapped into producing a confession 
when law enforcement officers overstep and induce a suspect rather than just providing an 
opportunity. Law enforcement officers are given the right to investigate in which they are legally 
and ethically allowed to use the Mr. Big technique, but if such tactics entrap a suspect to collect 
evidence like a confession, it will likely be inadmissible as it violates the Charter and the 
fundamental principles of justice. The decision of R v Mack [1988] is an important foundational 
precedent that determines the threshold of entrapment so this principle can be applied to future 
cases. This principle is further developed in more recent cases like R v Hart [2014]. 
R v Hart [2014] 
 In R. v. Hart [2014], the appellant was a father of two young twin daughters who 
drowned in a lake adjacent to a park nearby their family home in 2002 (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 
544, p.17). Mr. Hart was immediately suspected to be responsible for their deaths but there was a 
lack of evidence to charge him; two years following the drowning the RCMP began a Mr. Big 
operation and recruited him into their fictitious criminal organization in order to collect evidence 
(R v Hart, 2014, 2 SCR 544, p. 23). Four months into the investigation, Mr. Hart met Mr. Big 
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and confessed to killing his daughters, he was eventually charged with two counts of first-degree 
murder and was convicted (R v Hart, 2014, 2 SCR 544, p. 35-37).  
Mr. Hart appealed the conviction holding the operation was oppressive and led to a 
breach of his fundamental rights under s.7of the Charter and that his confessions should be 
inadmissible (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 40). Bringing attention to the admissibility of 
confessions but also an entrapment defense as Mr. Hart was implying, he was exploited and led 
into his ‘confession’. On appeal from the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, the SCC determined 
whether a new common law rule of evidence should be developed to determine the admissibility 
of Mr. Big confessions and if such confessions should be excluded. R v Hart [2014] is a 
monumental case that changed the course of Mr. Big operations in Canada with the introduction 
of a new common law confession rule for undercover operations. 
The Interrogation Trilogy 
 
The three cases of R v Oickle [2000], R v Singh [2007], R v Sinclair [2010] were heard by 
the SCC and, in the Court’s rationale in the three cases, created the “interrogation trilogy” that 
addresses different rules and rights under the common law and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. These precedents lay out safeguards for individuals in terms of limits on police 
interrogation in obtaining confessions, the right to silence during interrogations, and the right to 
counsel in context of police questioning (Dufraimont, 2011, p.309).  The rationales from the 
SCC in these decisions are critical in understanding the purposive principle of the Charter and 
the protections it provides suspects, thus checking police conduct. The SCC emphasizes the 
fundamental need for an appropriate balance of state interests and respecting entrenched 
protections of the individual. 
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Confession Rule - R v Oickle [2000] 
 
  R v Oickle [2000] was an important case as it was the first comprehensive restatement the 
SCC made of the ‘confessions rule’ since the Charter was established in 1982 (Smith, et al., 
2009, p.175). This case introduces the common law confession rule which outlines limits on 
police interrogation, which also addresses some considerable concern around Mr. Big operations 
producing false confessions (Dufraimont, 2011, p.309), (Keenan, 2010, p.33). The central issue 
for appeal of Mr. Oickle’s conviction was the voluntariness of his confession, the defense 
claimed that a number of factors in the interrogation raised reasonable doubts because the police 
exaggerated the reliability of the polygraph, threatened his fiancé with a polygraph, and 
minimized the legal significance of multiple convictions (Smith, et al., 2009, p. 175). 
Furthermore, the justices were tasked with deciding whether the police improperly induced the 
respondent’s confession through an environment of oppression, or through any threats or 
promises, or tactics that would raise a reasonable doubt to the voluntariness of the confession (R 
v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.1). In other words, the court was required to consider factors of 
voluntariness in the use of police trickery, threats, or promises which set precedent to be applied 
in multiple contexts such as Mr. Big operations (Smith, et al., 2009, p.175). 
To briefly explain this case, between February 5th, 1994 and April 4, 1995, there were a 
series of fires that appeared to be deliberately set involving buildings and motor vehicles, nearby 
where Mr. Oickle and his fiancé lived, one fire which happened to consume his fiancés car (R v 
Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.4-5). The police conducted their investigation and narrowed their list 
to seven or eight individuals to submit polygraph tests; most agreed to take the test or were 
cleared, but Mr. Oickle was seen resistant and within a matter of minutes of the test being 
administered it was determined he failed (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, para. 6-7). After being 
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reminded of his rights Mr. Oickle then confessed to setting fire to his fiancée’s car, within the 
next four hours he would also confess to setting seven to eight fires (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, 
p.9).   
At the initial trial, the judge held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the 
accused’s statements and ruled they were admissible and voluntary; Mr. Oickle was then 
convicted on all counts (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.10). However, Mr. Oickle’s charges were 
appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and they overturned the conviction, excluded the 
confessions from evidence, and an acquittal was entered. This was after considering the 
respondent was  
(N)ot coherent and in control during the videotaped interrogation, he was not aware  
the role of the equipment, while the police were minimizing the seriousness of the 
offense and did not clarify the polygraph results were not admissible as evidence which 
breached the respondent’s trust by unfairly and aggressively exploiting the results of the 
tests as a confession inducing instrument (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.10-18).  
The SCC allowed the appeal on the basis that the statements in question were the only 
evidence that directly implicated the respondent and without establishing their admissibility there 
would be no reasonable trier of fact to convict Mr. Oickle which was needed to convict without a 
reasonable doubt (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.21). This highlighted the importance in 
protecting the Charter which upholds fundamental rights of due process and the value in ensuring 
innocent people are not convicted (Smith, et al., 2009, p.175). Justice Iacobucci (as he was 
known then) wrote the majority rationale for the decision and identified that the Charter is not an 
exhaustive catalogue of rights for one to follow. He stated there is the utmost importance for the 
confessional rule to be administered on the principle of protecting the rights of the accused, but 
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without unduly limiting society’s need to investigate and solve crimes (R v Oickle [2000] 2 SCR 
3, p.31, p.33) (Keenan, 2010, p.34). Justice Iacobucci (as he was known then) also addresses the 
value of the confession rule in its ability to help with understanding problems surrounding false 
confessions and how it will uphold the diversity in confession approaches taken by law 
enforcement. (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.32).  
The SCC majority decision outlined that confessions must be identified as voluntary to be 
reliable, because an involuntary confession will be likely unreliable and thus inadmissible. This 
distinction is important as the confessions rule does not explicitly exclude statements elicited by 
undercover officers; statements could often be interpreted as involuntary due to the undercover 
nature of the interrogation and various and “can still violate the Charter” but that would become 
a matter for the courts to decide, any statements is not automatically involuntary or inadmissible 
(R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.28). The confession rule can be explained as, out of court 
statements made by an accused to a person of authority (law enforcement) are admissible as 
evidence, but only when statements can be without a reasonable doubt deemed voluntary in 
nature. For instance, “statements made as the result of intimidating questions, or questioning 
which is oppressive and calculated to overcome the freedom of will of the suspect for the 
purpose of extracting a confession” could become involuntary (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, 
p.33). This is not to neglect the operating mind of a suspect when confessing as this is important 
to consider alongside other elements of voluntariness (Dufraimont, 2011, p.312). To further 
explain, interrogation tactics that subtly minimize moral and legal consequences of a conviction 
by discrete suggestions about the benefits of confessing to an offense are deemed useful to 
police. These are not considered unreasonable or shock worthy to the community; but only as 
long as these tactics do not raise questions as to the voluntariness of the accused’s confession 
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(Smith, et al., 2009, p.176).  In which police interrogations are subjected to limits of the SCC 
decisions of the interrogation trilogy like the confession rule, right to counsel and right to silence 
(Acheneftos, 2010, para.2).  
Certain interrogation tactics such as Mr. Oickle being misled by having the reliability of 
evidence in the accuracy of polygraph exaggerated to him by police alone does not invalidate a 
confession, rather the manner in which conducted could challenge admissibility and the 
voluntariness (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.95). However, some tactics with greater threat like 
deception that fall under “police trickery” as seen in investigative tactics of Mr. Big operations, 
the common law requires a separate inquiry into the police trickery, meaning tactics must be held 
to a standard that would not “shock the community’s conscience” (Dufraimont, 2011, p.312). 
Not only would the voluntariness of a statement then need to be decided but it would also need to 
be held to a standard of shock worthy to the community. 
The SCC found that Mr. Oickle was not offered any inducements strong enough to raise a 
reasonable doubt to the voluntariness of the confession where there was no mistreatment and a 
mildly oppressive environment (R v Oickle, [2000] 2 SCR 3, p.104). The SCC then moved to 
restore the trial judge’s conviction of Mr. Oickle and set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
Therefore, Mr. Oickle’s were considered voluntary given the circumstances and could be 
admissible and used as evidence to convict him of his guilt. To interpret this confession rule in 
the circumstances of a Mr. Big operation where police trickery is often used, it is beneficial to 
identify that there is a standard of voluntary and involuntary confessions in which they must be 
obtained in a manner that would not “shock the community”, meaning interrogation tactics must 
not go beyond a reasonable level of inducement, oppression, or mistreatment in order to mitigate 
false confessions or confessions obtained at the expense of the accused’s rights. 
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In conclusion, the circumstances surrounding the voluntariness of a confession depend on 
the use of presence of threats or promises, oppression, and the operating mind; this also includes 
the consideration of police trickery that would “shock the community” to obtain a confession. 
Right to Silence - R v Hebert [1990] and R v Singh [2007] 
 
As the Charter does not explicitly state a “right to silence”, the SCC played a critical role 
in shaping limitations on interrogation practices as they recognize Charter s. 7 principles of 
fundamental justice are constitutionally protected (Dufraimont, 2011, p.313).  
R v Hebert [1990] 
The recognition that an accused’s right to silence is protected by s. 7 of the Charter is 
derived from the precedent of R v Hebert [1990], which first addressed s.7 in terms of pre-trial 
right to silence. This was a foundational decision for focusing on whether a statement made by a 
detained person to an undercover officer would violate the Charter; based upon the critical 
importance of achieving a balance between societal interests and the interests of the individual’s 
rights (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.45). Supreme Court Justice McLachlin (as she was 
known then) narrowly defined the right to silence in the rationale as, “the right to choose freely 
whether or not to speak to authorities” (Dufraimont, 2011, p.313). Therefore, in scope of the 
confession rule, jurisprudence on confessions revealed a theme linking the exercise of one’s free 
will in choosing to speak to ensure the impugned statement would not result in bringing the 
administration of justice into dispute (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.34). In the Hebert case, the 
appellant (Hebert) refused to speak with police but was tricked into making incriminating 
statements to an undercover officer in the same jail cell. The Court found that the police 
effectively negated Mr. Hebert’s free will in his choice to remain silent thus violating his rights. 
The particular circumstance in undercover investigations where the individual is not aware they 
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are speaking to an authority the court outlined specific facts to support a suspect who is not yet 
detained (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.46).  
To further explain, the Hebert decision established the fact that officers who are not 
undercover, in which an accused chooses on their own will to volunteer information, there is no 
violation of the charter. Furthermore, police persuasion, “short of denying the suspect the right to 
choose or depriving them of an operating mind” will also not breach the right to silence (R v 
Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, D. Conclusion). Although, there are different facts and considerations 
for undercover operations where officers are able to obtain information from the suspect prior to 
the detention. The Court explains this is because an undercover operative is technically not in 
control of the state and there is no need to protect a suspect from the “greater power of the state” 
in such instances (R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, D. Conclusion). In other words, the 
undercover operative is not detaining the individual but rather investigating, in which the Court 
found this section 7 protection would only apply after the suspect is detained by law enforcement 
(Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p.394). Justice McLachlin then emphasizes a distinction between 
undercover agents to observe a suspect and the use of undercover agents to elicit information in 
violation of the suspects choice to remain silent (R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, D. 
Conclusion). For example, as Mr. Big operations are a way of obtaining information or evidence 
from the target prior to detention, police may often use tactics such as deceit to interrogate the 
target after he or she has advised the police that they do not want to speak any further. The police 
would then likely be considered breaching the suspects rights by improperly eliciting information 
they were unable to obtain when initially respecting the suspects right to silence, thus taking 
away the suspects choice (R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, D. Conclusion). Regardless, Mr. Big 
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stings do not require protection from the state because the technique is considered an 
investigative function not a process of detaining the suspect (Puddister, & Riddell, 2012, p.394). 
R v. Singh [2007] 
 
More recently, the SCC in R v Singh [2007] had to readdress and consider the concept of 
self-incrimination from which the confession rule and right to silence are derived. There was 
considerable overlap between the inquiry into voluntariness of the statement and the review of 
s.7 in the alleged breach of the right to silence (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.24).  To provide 
a brief case summary for context in explaining this decision, Mr. Singh was arrested for second 
degree murder of a bystander outside a pub who was killed by a stray bullet. There was no 
forensic evidence, but a doorman of the pub was able to identify Mr. Singh as the shooter in a 
photo lineup (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.11). Mr. Singh was told of his right to counsel 
under s.10 and did consult with counsel (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.2). In two police 
interviews, Mr. Singh made it known he did not want to talk about the incident or knew anything 
about it. He asserted his right to silence 18 different times in these interrogations, officers would 
affirm his right but would continue to engage (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.13). By the end of 
the interrogation, Mr. Singh did make incriminating statements as he admitted to being in the 
pub on the day of the shooting and identified himself in the photograph, and then identified 
himself as a man in a videotape taken outside the pub on the night of the shooting (R v Singh, 
[2007] 3 SCR 405, p.12).  
During the voir dire to determine the admissibility of these statements prior to the trial, 
the judge followed the precedent of the confession rule from R v Oickle [2000], where he 
rationalized, he was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary” 
and admitted the evidence based upon its probative value (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.3). 
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Mr. Singh was convicted at trial and appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal on 
grounds of his s.7 right, arguing that if there was a proper application of s.7 the police would 
have had to of stopped trying to obtain admissions (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.17). The 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and concluded that the way in which the trial judge relied 
on the precedent of R v Hebert [1990], in terms of s.7 protection, the police persuasion in this 
interrogation did not deny Mr. Singh of the right to choose, nor did it deprive him of an operating 
mind; therefore, Mr. Singh’s s.7 right was not infringed, making the evidence admissible (R v 
Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.18).  The SCC, in a 5-4 majority decision, dismissed Mr. Singh’s 
appeal for conviction as the statements made in a police interrogation room were found to be 
made voluntarily, meaning they were obtained in a manner that did not infringe Mr. Singh’s 
rights and his conviction was upheld (Dufraimont, 2011, p.314).  
The majority decision explains that in the context of a police interrogation of a person in 
detention, “there are two tests for determining whether the suspect’s right to silence was 
respected” and are functionally equivalent (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.25). One test 
assesses the voluntariness of a confession under s.7 by using an objective test to assess the 
exercise of the accused’s free will (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.36). The second test follows 
the same directives of the confession rule (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.36). However, Justice 
Charron (as he was known then) who wrote the decision notes that these tests are only 
functionally equivalent when the “the confession rule effectively subsumes the constitutional 
right to silence,” meaning this test only applies in circumstances where the person is obviously in 
detention and is being interrogated by a known authority (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.39). 
As mentioned, R v Oickle [2000], this means that the confession rule will only apply when the 
suspect is aware that they are making a statement to a person in authority. Furthermore, the 
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jurisprudence relating to the right to silence has never, and currently does not extend to the 
protection against police tricks or any pre-detention interrogations (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, 
p.46). Police persuasion or any conduct considered just short of denying the suspect their right to 
choose or depriving their operating mind does not breach the right to silence only once the 
accused is detained (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.46). Therefore, an undercover agent who is 
unknown to the accused does not fall into this category and as R v Hebert [1990] and R v Singh 
[2007], have established the target in such operations really has limited protection of s.7 in their 
right to silence until detained.  
The notion of voluntariness in the right to remain silent speaks to the principle that a 
person is not obliged to talk, answer, or give information to police, in which an individual is 
unaware of the authority they unintendedly waive a ‘volunteering’ of a statement (R v Singh, 
[2007] 3 SCR 405, p.31). In the consideration of the confession rule, police trickery that would 
deny an accused’s right to silence could then be considered to produce an involuntary statement, 
and if found to reach the standard that shocks the community it is likely to be ruled inadmissible 
as it is an unreliably obtained statement (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.35). Therefore, further 
emphasizing that in Mr. Big Operations officers engaging in police trickery may overstep and 
deny the accused their right to silence through oppressive environments with Mr. Big and the use 
of threats or promises that influence his or her operating mind making any statements 
involuntary. However, to assess the voluntariness of a confession under s.7, Justice Charron 
explains that focus is directed to the conflict of police and the effect on the suspects ability to 
exercise their free will (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.36).  
Mr. Singh’s appeal was based on an issue that the police did not respect his constitutional 
right to remain silent. However, the SCC’s majority decided that under this two-step functional 
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equivalent test of the confession rule the statements were found voluntary, and the fact Mr. Singh 
had free will but chose to continue to speak to officers after asserting his rights makes these 
statements admissible evidence (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.49). The dissenting justices, 
however, held an interesting alternative in disagreement of the majority decision, explaining they 
believe that the ability of the police to investigate crime in Canada would be not be impaired by 
effective exercise to pre-trial right to silence as implied by rational of Justice Charron (R v Singh, 
[2007] 3 SCR 405, p.82). Holding that a detainee’s right to silence should rather be respected 
and not deliberately undermined by police through their persistence (Dufraimont, 2011, p.315). 
Right to Counsel – R v Sinclair [2010] 
 
R v Sinclair [2010] is the third and final case to explore in the interrogation trilogy. In 
this case, the SCC considered the meaning of s.10, and the various implementation duties of 
police in custodial interrogations (Dufraimont, 2011, p.315). Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Charron wrote the majority decision explaining that the appeal concerns the nature and limits of 
the right to counsel under s.10 of the Charter, concerning statements made during interrogations. 
Section. 10(b) of the Charter is to allow a person who has been arrested or detained the “right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right” which places 
informational and implementation duties on the police which they must inform the detainee and 
also provide the opportunity and ability to exercise that right (Dufraimont, 2011, p.315). The 
issue for Mr. Sinclair was whether he, as a detainee in police custody, had properly been 
accorded his s.10 Charter right to further consultations with counsel during the course of 
interrogations (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p.1). 
Mr. Sinclair was charged with second degree murder for killing another man but was 
convicted at trial for manslaughter (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p.4). The conduct in 
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question concerns the interrogation of Mr. Sinclair after his arrest. Mr. Sinclair was said to be 
advised he was being arrested and was read his Charter warning of the right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay, and that a legal aid lawyer would be available free of charge (R v Sinclair, 
[2010] 2 SCR 310, p.5). He did not want to contact a lawyer right away and was taken to the 
RCMP detachment where he was asked if he wanted to exercise his right. Mr. Sinclair did speak 
to his lawyer by the phone in a private room for three minutes (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, 
p.6). Later in the day, Mr. Sinclair’s interrogation lasted for around 5 hours and he upheld his 
right to silence. As questioning continued to progress, Mr. Sinclair repeatedly expressed 
discomfort within being interviewed without his lawyer. Four- or five-times Mr. Sinclair 
adamantly expressed a desire to speak with his lawyer and his intent to remain silent without his 
guidance (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p.10). However, each time he asked the interrogator 
validated Mr. Sinclair’s right but continued to proceed with further questioning and tactics of 
confrontation to get Mr. Sinclair to confess (Dufraimont, 2011, p.316). The RCMP explained 
that Mr. Sinclair’s right to counsel was considered satisfied through the prior telephone call and 
he was not entitled to have his lawyer present during the questioning. By end of day, the police 
had placed Mr. Sinclair in a cell with an undercover officer in which he made an incriminating 
statement and then accompanied the police to where the murder occurred and participated in a 
re-enactment (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p.13).  
At trial, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of the statements Mr. 
Sinclair made during the initial interview, the exchange with the undercover officer and the re-
enactment (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p.15). It was proven that the statements were 
voluntary and admissible in court. The trial judge further decided that s.10 of the Charter had 
been satisfied with the phone call with his lawyer prior to the interview (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 
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SCR 310, p.15). The defense appealed the conviction of manslaughter specifying the appellant’s 
repeated requests to speak with his lawyer during the course of the interview that were denied 
constituted a breach of s.10 (R v Sinclair, [2010’ 2 SCR 310, p.16).  The British Columbia Court 
of Appeal dismissed Mr. Sinclair’s appeal and affirmed his conviction. The case is then brought 
to the SCC where Mr. Sinclair continued to argue that s.10 requires the police to respect a 
detainee’s request to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 
SCR 310, p.18).  The SCC dismissed the appeal in a majority decision of 5-4, finding Mr. 
Sinclair’s s. 10 right was not unreasonably breached. 
Mr. Sinclair had argued that the wording of s.10 makes it clear this right arises upon 
detention but there is no text to directly indicate when the right is exhausted or satisfied, The 
Court had to consider if “retain and instruct” implies a continuing right, or if “on arrest or 
detention” indicates a specific point in time and not a continuum (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 
310, p. 20-21). This required the SCC to conduct a purposive analysis of s.10 of the Charter, 
where the Court determined the purpose of this right is to provide the detainee with an 
opportunity to obtain legal advice relevant to the legal situation (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, 
p. 24). As identified in R v Hebert [1990], s.7 and s.10 work together to ensure a suspect is able 
to make the choice to speak to investigators in which they can exercise their operating mind 
through free will and informed decisions (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 25). The SCC then 
made a crucial distinction specifying that the state is not obliged to protect the suspect against 
making incriminating statements, but rather obliged to use legitimate means of persuasion to 
encourage a suspect to do so and allow the suspect to make informed choices (R v Sinclair, 
[2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 26).  
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In further analysis of s.10, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron analyze the 
purpose and continuance of the right. The SCC decided that the right to counsel that arises upon 
detention is satisfied by law enforcement doing two things: offering an initial warning where the 
detainee is informed of their right to counsel and affording reasonable opportunity for the 
detainee to consult the counsel (Dufraimont, 2011, p.316) (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 
27). This was demonstrated by law enforcement notifying Mr. Sinclair of his s.10 right and 
providing him two opportunities to reach a lawyer and allowed him to speak to said lawyer. 
However, Sinclair advanced that a detainee should have a lawyer present upon request during the 
entirety of the interview and that this right should be a continuous ‘protection’ (R v Sinclair, 
[2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 33).  The Court explained that s.10 does not contemplate such a 
requirement, as the wording in the Charter “reasonably connote more than a perfunctory 
consultation prior to the interrogation” (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 35). Thus, there is no 
implied notion that counsel should be present throughout the interview process. There is also the 
notion that changing circumstances would allow the detainee to consult their counsel a second 
time. In a matter of a “change in jeopardy”, meaning the investigation takes a more serious turn 
the initial advice from the lawyer may no longer suit the situation (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 
310, p. 51). Therefore, the Court decides that the detainee must be given further opportunity to 
consult with counsel to obtain advice on the new situation to fulfil the purpose of s.10 (R v 
Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 51).  
Section 10 of the Charter should be interpreted in a way that fully respects the purpose of 
supporting the detainees s.7 right to silence (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p. 47). The Charter 
intersects as s.10 and s.7 often overlap.  For instance, if an accused’s s.10 right to counsel is 
denied, their statement will likely be involuntary, thus inadmissible as evidence in consideration 
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of s.7 and the confession rule. Furthermore, if the police comply with s.10, it will not make a 
statement automatically voluntary. If a voluntary statement is made by the accused, there could 
still be a breach of s.10 (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 310, p.29). The question outlined in this case 
concerned whether Mr. Sinclair should have been given a second opportunity to consult with a 
lawyer when asked. The majority decided that Mr. Sinclair did not satisfy any of the categories 
that would satisfy re-consultation with his counsel. Hence, he received his legal advice fulfilling 
the purpose of s.10 as there was no change in jeopardy he was facing (R v Sinclair, [2010] 2 SCR 
310, p.66). In conclusion, this case set precedent that outlined the proper performance functions 
of s.10, further identifying the critical balance between individual rights and the intentions of the 
state.  
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Implications 
 
To understand an accused’s rights during police investigations, the purposive elements of 
the Charter must be explained. The Charter is a critical document that lays out the rights and 
freedoms Canadian’s believe are necessary in a democratic and free society (Government of 
Canada, 2020, para.1). The Charter identifies and enshrines six broad categories of rights 
consisting of: fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, the right to 
equality and equal benefit under the law, and language rights (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, p.48-49). 
The Charter’s rights and freedoms radiate its foundational values that are used to protect 
individuals and the social contract in Canada; values of equality, human dignity, autonomy, 
religious freedom, fairness, expressive freedom, advancement of democracy, and privacy are 
upheld through various sections (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.54-57). The Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is entrenched in the Canadian Constitution making it supreme in law with its rights 
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and freedoms to Canadian’s. Therefore, it is protected and highest of all other laws, meaning all 
other statues must be consistent with the Charter.  
The boundaries, purposes, and definition of the sections of the Charter have developed 
over time from Supreme Court precedent, which has transformed the course of criminal 
investigations and the judicial proceedings while expanding legal rights in terms of the accused. 
The Court must interpret and apply the meaning of the Charter to protect the core principles and 
values of equality, human dignity, fairness, autonomy, expression freedom, religious freedom, 
democracy advancement, and privacy. Overtime the Charter has been able to increase the 
judicial responsibility and the ability delineate the line between crime control and due process 
(Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p. 295). In exploring the legal rights that are engaged by criminal 
investigations such as Mr. Big operations it is important to understand that the Charter is a 
purposive document that is interpreted and explained based upon the Court’s purposive method 
of interpreting the meaning of the right or freedom with the issue at hand to determine whether 
the matter consists of an infringement (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.56).  
However, the rights and freedoms provided by the Charter are also not absolute, as 
identified by s.1 there can be justifiable ‘reasonable’ limits to where the interests of society at 
large or the rights of other individual will justifiably require limitations (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, 
p. 53). Section 1 guarantees the rights and freedoms but defines they are subject to “limitations 
prescribed by law” in which the sections are subject to “reasonable limits” when they can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B 
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 982, c11, s.1). To determine what is reasonable in terms of 
infringement section 1 imposes the Oakes test, derived from R. v. Oakes [1986], in which this 
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decision made it clear, judges must proportionally review the case using the discretion of 
minimal impairment (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p. 81).  
The Oakes test is a two-step process: the first step asks if the legislative goal is pressing 
and substantial, speaking to the state’s objective being important enough to justify the limitation.  
The second step asks if there is proportionality between the objective and the means used to the 
state’s objective (Department of Justice, 2021, para. 3. The Oakes Test). If a judge answers yes to 
the above questions, they must then consider three different branches of (a) rational connection, 
the limit being rationally connected to the objective, (b) minimal impairment, asking if the 
challenged legislation infringes on the right or freedom more than what is necessarily for the 
legislation’s objective, and (c) the final balancing, that there must be proportionality between the 
effects of the law (Department of Justice, 2021, para. 3. The Oakes Test). Although, section 1 
“does not play a role in police officer’s actions in limiting the Charter right are not specifically 
authorized or prescribed by law” (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p. 67). In other words, if the conduct 
of law enforcement violates, but is not authorized by statute or is not set out in the law, it cannot 
be justified under section 1.  In such situations, a court would go straight to a remedy phase of 
the analysis (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p. 67).  
The Charter essentially provides legal safeguards to protect the right of the defendant and 
to try to minimize errors of the investigation process; in which section 7 of fundamental 
freedoms and section 11, pertaining to proceedings in criminal and penal matters are most often 
engaged in this regard (Smith, et al., 2009, p.173). The Supreme Court of Canada’s role in 
setting precedent that determine the parameters of police powers has expanded greatly since the 
introduction of the Charter of Rights of Freedoms in 1982; leading the SCC to hear arguments 
questioning Mr. Big cases that infringe section 7 rights (right to silence), the admissibility of 
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statements, persons in authority doctrine, and the abuse of process and dirty tricks (Puddister, & 
Riddell, 2012, p. 393).  
Section 7 of the Charter: Fundamental Justice 
 
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states, “everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c11 s 7). 
This right is seen upholding many Charter values as it engages personal liberty. To further 
explain, courts have determined the concept of “fundamental rights” and the scope of their 
protections in applying section 7. As the Charter holds a purposive approach, this section of the 
Charter addresses the concern between proper balance of individual rights and the proceedings of 
an accused’s life, liberty or security (R v Herbert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, III.  Purpose of Right to 
Silence).  Section 7 is an essential legal right as it seeks to impose limits on the power of the state 
over a detained person (R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405, p.45). It provides protection against the 
unfair use of the state’s superior resources but also maintains the state’s power to deprive a 
person of their life, liberty, or security in which balance of right is crucial to the administration 
of justice.  
To begin understanding section 7, the language of this right such as concepts of life, 
liberty, and security of the person must briefly be defined. The right to life would be used in 
instances where the state conduct would deprive an individual of their life (Stewart, 2012, p.63). 
This is to say the SCC has recognized “life” in a civil sense and in consideration when 
someone’s survival is at stake. They have not yet addressed the scope of life directly; although it 
is engaged when there is a substantial risk to life. Liberty is more complex with its various legal 
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and political discourses, but liberty allows individuals to be free from physical constraint. When 
there are deprivations of liberty by state actions like inhibiting an individual from making 
choices on personal decisions without interference their section 7 right would be engaged 
(Stewart, 2012, p.65). This means that an average citizen is free from state-imposed unjustified 
constraint or imprisonment because they cannot be deprived of their liberty; hence people’s 
liberty is only restricted once they have been given a fair trial and are guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt as this is a fundamental principle.  
The SCC has identified that in the interest of liberty it is not merely restricted to mean 
physical restraint either, but in instances where the state compulsions or prohibitions affect the 
importance of fundamental life choices (Stewart, 2012, p.68). This aspect of liberty is engaged in 
penal proceedings, civil proceedings, prison conditions, parole eligibility, psychiatric detention, 
among others. This ensures that section 7 is meant to protect against any state-imposed 
deprivation of one’s liberty that does not comply with principles of fundamental justice (Stewart, 
2012, p.71). Lastly, security of the person refers to both bodily and psychological integrity of the 
individual. It has been interpreted by the SCC that state imposed “psychological stress” is a 
component of the criminal law context (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.252). Therefore, security of 
the person includes and exceeds physical integrity of the person, property and immediate 
surroundings of a person, and their psychological integrity. These foundational concepts of life, 
liberty, and security will be engaged when the state interferes in profoundly intimate and 
personal choices of the individual (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.252).  
Through continuous SCC decisions the principles of fundamental justice are constantly 
evolving, growing, and being redefined. Since section 7 is the foundation of the legal rights the 
fundamental freedoms it upholds are necessary in advancing this discussion. The aspects of 
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fundamental principles connect with individual personal choices and privacy interests, in which 
there are three main categories in which the SCC has defined a range of principles: fault, 
procedural and substantive. The “fault principles” refers to mens rea, the act of the crime relating 
to the individual’s criminal intent. As well as including aspects of procedural fairness (justice) 
that serve to protect the administration of justice and substantive justice principles that protect 
the individual from unjust laws (Stewart, 2012, p.126). To further explain, substantive principles 
of fundamental justice are most often associated with the areas of statues, regulations, and 
common law rules. Thus, principles of fundamental justice under a substantive lens require laws 
not to be overly vague, not to be overly broad, nor arbitrary, or not grossly disproportionate and 
must uphold moral blameworthiness (Stewart, 2012, p.127-149). With that being said there are 
numerous principles to govern the penal aspects of the law including investigations. This 
introduces the need for procedural justice which covers a wide range of fundamental principles 
that the SCC has deemed crucial such as: the right to full disclosure, best evidence rule, the right 
to full answer and defense, as well as the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. All 
of which are seen as interacting principles in the context of Mr. Big operations. 
Although section 7 provides an individual procedural right under the general language of 
section 7, they are not specifically guaranteed as specifically laid out in legal rights of sections 8 
to 14 but through these internal principles are upheld (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.303). This is to 
mention that this section of fundamental justice is different from other Charter sections as they 
are not a free-standing guarantee. A critical distinction that these rights are only invoked where 
state action or law has violated life, liberty, and security of the person, (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, 
p.255). Furthermore, the SCC has recognized this point through the “residual role” section 7 
plays in relation to the other specific guarantees in s.8 through s.14. This section is a 
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“steppingstone” for other protections, serving as a foundation of all conduct that fundamental 
justice principles must be respected and upheld (Stewart, 2012, p.9).   
Procedural Fundamental Justice Principles: Right to Silence  
 
Section 7 and the right to silence applies when a detainee is speaking to an agent of the 
state (Stewart, 2012, p.211). In penal investigations, section 7 protects the procedural principles 
of fundamental justice that a detainee has the right to silence and thus should make an ‘informed’ 
decision about whether to speak to an authority (Stewart, 2012, p.210). The SCC has 
demonstrated, as written by then Justice McLachlin, that the right to silence of a detained person 
must be broad enough to grant a detained person a free choice on whether to speak or remain 
quite (R v Herbert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, I. Related Rights). This is notwithstanding the fact that he 
or she is in the superior power of the state. (R v Herbert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, III. Purpose of Right 
to Silence).  This fundamental principle affords that a person who is not detained, rather a 
suspect in an investigation retains the protection of general liberty under section 7 in which they 
are to decide whether or not to speak to an officer (Stewart, 2012, p.210). As established through 
the confession rule a statement must be deemed voluntary for it to be admissible, in which an 
individual is protected from prejudice, inducement, oppressive questioning, or other police 
misconduct or trickery as the right to remain silent is a principle of fundamental justice and 
engaging in such behavior to obtain confessional evidence would be a section 7 infringement of 
the suspects liberty and right to silence (Stewart, 2012, p.212).  
To further explain, the right to silence by its nature is exercised differently than the other 
legal Charter rights. For example, the Charter’s section 8 right to counsel is held within the 
control of an accused with an operating mind in which conduct from the authorities does not 
impact the detainee by taking away his or her ability to choose (R v Singh, 2007, 3 SCR 405, 
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p.43).  This means in an undercover officer scenario where a “fellow inmate” is sharing a cell in 
which a confession is spoken it is not always considered an infringement of section 7 in how it 
was obtained. As explained in R v Singh and R v Hebert, the common law recognizes an 
individual’s right to remain silent, but this does not mean that authorities cannot speak to this 
individual, there is constitutional importance in law enforcement being able to perform their 
investigative duties. The SCC has identified that the scope of this right to silence for individual 
to exercise must also extend to exclude tricks which would effectively deprive the suspect of this 
choice, this means authorities cannot trick the suspect into making a confession after they have 
exercised their right (R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, III.  Purpose of Right to Silence).  
In the case where police trickery is in question, the SCC held that two questions must be 
asked, “was the evidence obtained by the state?” and “was the evidence elicited?” only if the 
answer is yes to both of these will there be a section 7 violation. This is not to say that this 
protects an individual from being questioned, or that the police are not allowed to continue 
questioning the suspect once they have reasserted their right to silence or once they have 
obtained counsel (Stewart, 2012, p.212). It is only where police questioning or trickery denies 
the suspect of the right to choose or deprives them of an operating mind that police questioning 
can violate the right to silence (Stewart, 2012, p.212). As the Charter does not explicitly 
guarantee a right to silence, this principle of fundamental justice must continue to be outlined in 
consideration of the evolving cases. Although the recognized pre-trial right to silence afforded 
under section 7 also leads to section 11(c) of the Charter that protects against the principle of 
self-incrimination; both of these rights prevent the Crown from arguing that an individual 
selecting to invoke their right to silence would imply or be evidence guilt (Stewart, 2012, p.247).  
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Violation of Section 7.  
Section 7 is considered infringed if there is a deprivation of life, liberty, or security of the person 
or if there is deprivation of the principles of justice (Department of Justice, 2019, para. 4). 
Therefore, in face of a section 7 Charter violation (section 7 test) the applicant must demonstrate 
that (1) there is some state conduct to which the Charter applies, meaning is there a practice, 
policy, law, or lawful exercise of state authority that infringes on the individuals life, liberty or 
security, (2) the applicant is a ‘natural persons’, (3) the state conduct affects the applications life, 
liberty, security of the person and (4) the conduct is not in accordance to those afforded 
principles of fundamental justice (Stewart, 2012, pp. 21-22). This burden of proof for the 
analysis of section 7 puts the burden on the applicant to demonstrate that their right to life, 
liberty, or security of the person had been denied against the indefinable principles of 
fundamental justice in which it must meet the civil standard on the balance of probabilities 
(Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.254).  State conduct that will be assessed refers to the areas of statutes 
and regulations, government entities, private and public law litigation, as well as the exercises of 
statutory powers and discretion among the various state conduct surrounding investigations. In 
summary, an applicant must be able to demonstrate that their section 7 right was violated on the 
basis of the discussed fundamental principles. 
Justification under Section 1. 
 If the three elements required of a violation are established it is still “theoretically” 
possible for such act to be rescued by section 1 where the government could be justified but 
these cases will be extremely rare (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.88 & pp.246-247). The SCC has 
specified that a violation of the Charter s.7 will only be saved by s.1 in cases arising out of 
“exceptional conditions like natural disasters, the outbreak of war, and epidemics, and the like” 
(Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.247).  The strict definition of section 7 places limitations on 
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determining violations where the influences of section 1 analysis to determine an infringement of 
the right is not required (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p. 88). To further explain, section 7 is different 
at its core as it holds internal qualifiers where the requirement of the state to respect the 
“principles of fundamental justice” will overlap with the section 1 test for justification of a 
reasonable infringement, in which it is very difficult to justify a violation under section 1 
(Stewart, 2012, p.5).  
A section 7 violation holds a significant burden of proof, which if met would demonstrate 
that such conduct was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice that could 
rarely be justified under section 1 of the Charter as it violated the individuals very right to life, 
liberty, and security (Stewart, 2012, p.289). Justice Wilson furthers this rationale by saying, he 
does “not believe that a limit on s.7… could either be reasonable or demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society” (Stewart, 2012, p.289). This identifies the utmost value and respect 
for the principles of fundamental justice on their own, for only in extreme cases should an 
individual’s section 7 right ever be justifiably infringed. Otherwise, section 7 and the principles 
of fundamental justice are so critical they cannot be overridden or infringed on the basis of state 
or social interests (Stewart, 2012, p.290). Therefore, the section 1 justifications for violations 
under section 7 are considered “rare” as they simply would not be able to pass the minimal 
impairment aspect of the Oakes test due to the utmost importance of the fundamental principles 
of justice (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.89). The threshold for justifiably in limiting section 7 rights 
is a higher threshold than the one used in s.1 for limiting other charter rights as it requires 
extreme circumstantial situations to even consider a “reasonable” justification for such violation 




Section 11(d) of the Charter: Innocent Until Proven Guilty 
 
Section 11 of the Charter identifies the legal rights afforded to an individual who is 
charged with an offense. It highlights procedural justice foundations that lay out principles and 
rights while placing limitations on judicial proceedings within the subsections a through i. This 
section only applies to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, and proceedings that give rise to 
penal consequences, meaning it applies to the prosecutions for criminal offences (Sharpe, & 
Roach, 2017, p.325). Section.11(d) will be of particular focus as it states the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c11 s 11). The presumption of 
innocence itself is an essential principle in Canada’s free and democratic society in which it is 
committed to values of fairness and social justice (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.330). The rights 
protected under section 11 are residual, pertaining to upholding all the principles of fundamental 
justice, and the life, liberty, and security of the person as identified in section 7 (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c11 s 11).  
With that being said, in light of undercover Mr. Big operations and confessions, section 
11(d) is critical to understand in securing an accused’s liberty. Section 11(c) is another important 
residual right.  It also protects an individuals’ right against self-incrimination, but it only relates 
specifically to the event of the trial of an accused and protects them from not having to testify in 
court that would incriminate them.  This right is not of value to the discussion of Charter right 
engagement and Mr. Big (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.328). With that being said, the purpose of 
section 11(d) ensures that those who are guilty are ultimately condemned by the justice system, 
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but also ensures the guilt is determined in a fair process of reasonable doubt, upholding the 
essential foundational values of the Charter such as, fairness and life, liberty and security 
(Department of Justice, 2021a, Purpose). This brings attention to the presumption of innocence, 
the very principle the Canadian criminal justice system operates on, the principle that people are 
presumed innocent until they are proven, beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of judge 
or jury that they are guilty of the offense being tried; meaning everyone is innocent until they are 
convicted in court of law (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.469). 
The presumption of innocence is a basic fundamental right in the Charter. Its specifically 
aims to restrain coercive power which helps avoid the risk of wrongful conviction and it also 
upholds the due process of the justice system to those who are ‘guilty’ (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, 
p.295). The term “innocent” is defined as “wrongly accused of having committed all the 
elements of the offense” or including they have no true defense to their charge (p.13). Section 11 
is protected under the legal rights and is built upon the foundation. of section 7 but they do vary 
in terms of their applicability. For instance, for s.11 infringements it becomes the crown’s 
responsibility to determine that the proved fact does not flow from the presumed fact in which 
11(d) would be limited and requires to be justified under the section 1 Oakes test (Department of 
Justice, 2021a, Section 1 Considerations).   
This can be a difficult right to understand as an accused must rely on their defense in 
which they are subjected with the legal burden of proving their innocence; but yet the right is 
supposed to allow them to be presumed innocent (Mahoney, 1988, p.14). Regardless of how 
complex, the SCC has ruled that an accused relying on a defense is not necessarily asserting 
innocence, in which it reaches outside the sphere of a Charter guarantee of the presumption of 
innocence (Mahoney, 1988, p.14). The presumption of innocence then becomes a more moral 
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aspect of the Charter than legal, but it is crucial to uphold until the accused is proven guilty 
(Mahoney, 1988, p. 18).  
 In order to justify a section 11 infringement, it would be subjected to s.1 Oakes Test, in 
which the individual would need to rebut the presumption and the crown would need to establish 
the standard of minimal impairment in which the absence of the presumption would mean the 
offence cannot operate effectively (Department of Justice, 2021a, Section 1 Considerations). 
This interpretation can be applied to regulatory offences and judicial independence outside of the 
presumed facts facing an accused. However, the SCC has demonstrated that under section 1, the 
accused must be able to use a balance of probabilities for their defense of due diligence or lack of 
negligence which can be challenging (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.332). Furthermore, the vital role 
played by judicial independence in the constitution and the charter values has also been 
demonstrated by the SCC that the standard application of section 1 test could not alone justify a 
reasonable infringement of an individual’s independence (Department of Justice, 2021a, Section 
1 Considerations). Section 11 also holds some structure of internal tests, in which only in the 
direst circumstances could a government present convincing evidence to justify an infringement 
on someone’s judicial independence. The SCC continues to interpret the presumption of 
innocence in a broad sense so that regardless of the existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt, 
the individual’s right could still be infringed whenever a person may be convicted (Sharpe, & 
Roach, 2017, p. 332).  
R. v. Hart [2014] 
 
The R v Hart [2014] case is the most recent SCC landmark case where a two-pronged 
framework for assessing the admissibility of Mr. Big confessions was created. This case brought 
attention to interaction of the Charter and the confessions rule, in light of a complex undercover 
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technique. As mentioned in earlier discussion, Mr. Hart was a father of two young twin 
daughters who drowned at a park under his supervision in 2002 (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, 
p.17). Three-year old Karen and Krista Hart went with their father to a neighbourhood park to 
play, which also had a lake adjacent to it (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.16). Mr. Hart and the 
girls were gone for roughly 30-45 minutes until he returned home without his daughters, telling 
his wife that Krista had fallen into the water and he had forgotten Karen at the park (R v Hart, 
[2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 17). Moments later Mr. Hart and his wife were back at the park with an 
ambulance where Krista and Karen were found floating several meters apart from each other, 
they were pronounced dead (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 18).  
Mr. Hart was immediately suspected to be responsible for their deaths due to his “unusual 
behavior” (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 19). It was suspicious that he did not call anyone or 
stop anywhere closer for help, yet he denied any accusations that he had drowned the girls (R v 
Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.19). However, there was very little information available with no 
witnesses and no other evidence beyond Hart’s statements (Murphy, & Anderson, 2016, p.30). 
Two weeks following the initial questioning, Mr. Hart volunteered that he had not been truthful 
in his previous statements, saying he had a medical seizure at the park and when he “came to” 
his daughters were laying in the water. Although, the police were convinced he was guilty but 
there was a lack of evidence to charge him, and the case went cold. 
Two years following the drownings, the RCMP began a Mr. Big operation targeting Mr. 
Hart in order to collect evidence for the case. The officers began their surveillance in December 
2004 and made their first move to recruit him into their fictitious criminal organization by 
February 2005 (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 23). Mr. Hart was unemployed, receiving social 
assistance, was antisocial and was a rather socially isolated person; thus, it was not a challenge 
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for the undercover officers to weave themselves into his life and get him to participate in 
numerous simulated criminal activities with the officers while he received financial rewards and 
travelled around Canada. By April 2005, Mr. Hart was hooked and admitted he felt he had 
“brothers” within this friendship he had built with the operatives (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, 
p.26-28,38).  By May 2005, the operatives began working towards Mr. Hart meeting Mr. Big, 
they told him that there was a “big deal” coming in that would “set [Mr. Hart] up financially” but 
only if he was approved to participate in the deal by Mr. Big who recognized a past criminal 
problem and needed to meet with him to resolve it (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 32). 
When Mr. Hart met Mr. Big, he was asked about the death of his daughters and why he 
had killed them, Mr. Hart admitted he had suffered a seizure in which their deaths were an 
accident, but he denied killing them (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 34). Mr. Big pushed further, 
using various interrogation tactics such as reassuring the respondent not to “lie”, prodding in the 
events further, along with having the incentive of monetary gain and legal assistance; by the end 
of the meeting Mr. Hart confessed to drowning his daughters (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.323). He 
rationalized that he killed the girls out of fear that he would lose them to the province’s child 
welfare agency, he said the girls “fell” over the dock, but when pressing further he also revealed 
he had “struck his daughters” (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.35-36). Two days after this 
confession Mr. Hart went to the location of the crime and re-enacted how the droning occurred, 
Mr. Hart was then shortly charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the death of his two 
daughters, Krista and Karen. In total there were three confessions made from Mr. Hart during 
this investigation. 
Mr. Hart was convicted at trial level and then appealed his conviction holding the 
operation was oppressive and led to a breach of his fundamental rights under section 7of the 
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Charter, and that his confessions should then be inadmissible (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 
40). This forced the judges to consider the admissibility of confessions and his defense of 
entrapment as Mr. Hart was arguing that he was exploited and was led into his ‘confession’. His 
appeal to the Newfoundland Court of Appeal was dismissed as the appeal court did not feel Mr. 
Hart was threatened and had the operating mind to leave at his will throughout the operation (R v 
Hart. [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.41). When appealed again, the SCC had to address if the confessions 
made by Mr. Hart during the Mr. Big operation should be admissible, and if it breached his 
section 7 right to silence.  
As seen in the interrogation trilogy, the SCC in the past held that Mr. Big undercover 
operations simply do not engage the right to silence because the accused is not detained by the 
police at the time in which they confessed. Further, the confession rule requires a confession to 
be ‘voluntary’ it becomes an inoperative standard because the accused is not aware they are 
talking to an authority or in the presence of the state when they confess (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 
544, p. 64). This can alternatively be viewed that the accused does not have an operating mind to 
leave because they are not yet detained and thus do not know they are confessing to an authority. 
Mr. Big confessions could be challenged through the abuse of process doctrine or upon the 
discretion of a judge to determine is probative value; however, infringed challenged Mr. Big 
confessions is not a common finding in the common law (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 65). 
Furthermore, the SCC found that the threshold in which this previously described framework 
protects the rights of the individual was inadequate in protecting them in Mr. Big investigations. 
They agreed that Mr. Big confessions do present unique dangers that must be addressed “by 
placing a filter on their admissibility”; the past law provided insufficient protection to an accused 
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due to the danger of unreliable confessions, the prejudicial effect of Mr. Big confessions and the 
risk of police misconduct (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.66).  
The New Common Law Rule  
 
In his decision on behalf of the Court, Supreme Court Justice Moldaver brought attention 
to the fact there is considerable danger in confessions obtained by Mr. Big in terms of reliability. 
As the very purpose of the operation is to induce a confession, there is risk in the various tactics 
used on the pretense that a suspect will confess about the crime being investigated because they 
are under the impression such confession could result in a consequence free escape and allow 
them to join an organization and all its appealing rewards (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 68). 
Another concern was that there are considerable prejudicial facts present when dealing with the 
accused’s character in court of law. This means the jury may negatively interpret that the target 
as a person because he or she was willing or wanted to join a criminal organization and 
participated in crime they thought believed was real; this could unintentionally convey bad 
character of the accused (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 73). Furthermore, the SCC advanced 
that Mr. Big confessional evidence that is unreliable and prejudicial presented before the jury 
would invite miscarriages of justice. Lastly, limiting police misconduct is of large concern due to 
the nature of the operation. These investigations create a risk that an officer may resort to 
unacceptable or unethical tactics in obtaining the confession as they are working under pressure, 
with an alternative identity, in an environment of violence and stress which can perpetuate 
threats or violence resulting in the police going “too far” in their investigation of the suspect (R v 
Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 78).   
The confession rule or the right to silence did not address the uniqueness of Mr. Big 
operations and did not afford an accused of all their legal rights under the Charter in these 
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situations which puts them at a disadvantage (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 79). The SCC 
decided that there was not an effective mechanism for monitoring police conduct when 
undercover and that there needed to be a ‘better’ law to protect individuals. To remedy this the 
Court outlined a new common law rule for Mr. Big investigations. Created with the intention of 
balancing the dangers posed by Mr. Big operations while ensuring police have the tools they 
need to investigate, Justice Moldaver outlined a new common law rule to determine the 
admissibility of Mr. Big confessions and if such confessions should be excluded in court. (R. v 
Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 84).  
This rule is a two-pronged approach that recognizes a new common law rule of evidence 
and relies on a more robust conception of the doctrine of abuse process to address reliability, 
prejudice, and to address police misconduct (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 119).  The new rule 
determined that confessions obtained in the course of Mr. Big operations are to be presumptively 
inadmissible. They can be admitted but the Crown must establish on a balance of probability that 
the probative value of the confessions should outweigh its prejudicial effect (Hunt, & Rankin, 
2014, p.322). This approach is consistent with the demands of self-incrimination and other 
Charter legal rights that uphold protecting against abusive state conduct and unreliable 
confessions (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.123).  The first prong of the test to determine 
reliability of the confession in Mr. Big operations concerns the probative value, in which the 
circumstances surrounding a confession need to be assessed whether they would influence the 
reliability of the confession made (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.132).  Factors that are now 
considered by judges include the number of interactions between the target and police, the nature 
of the relationship between undercover operatives and target, the extent and nature of the 
inducements presented to the target, if there were any threats, the interrogation itself, and the 
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personality and mental characteristics of the target such as their age, mental disorders, 
sophistication, etc. (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.325). The prejudicial effect of the matter refers to 
the prejudice that could result based on the targets desire to join the organization or their 
participation in the simulated crimes that could dampen his other character in the fair trial (Hunt, 
& Rankin, 2014, p.322).  
In the second prong of the new evidentiary test, Moldaver acknowledged the abuse of 
process doctrine had provided little protection for the accused in Mr. Big investigations because 
it would be nearly impossible to determine a threshold for when such operation could become 
abusive, especially given its secretive properties (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.325). The SCC then 
suggested that signs of abusive practice within the context of these operations included behavior 
such as threated or actual physical violence, psychological coercion that overcomes the will of 
the accused, or operations preying or targeting on vulnerabilities such a substance abuse, 
youthfulness, mental health issues, etc. which would be highly problematic for the confession to 
be reliable in this context (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.325) (Murphy, & Anderson, 2016, p.38).  
Regarding the admissibility of Mr. Hart’s confession itself, the SCC considered that he 
had confessed on three separate occasions but the justices also considered those crucial factors 
that he was isolated, unemployed, and living on welfare, in which the operation had 
“transformed” his life for the better; he was heavily involved in scenarios and had daily contact 
with these officers during the course of the investigation making this a “lengthy and intense 
operation” (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.133). Mr. Hart was also exposed to powerful 
inducements, Mr. Big claimed he could offer Mr. Hart a financial gain that would bring him out 
of poverty if he was admitted into this organization, in which the respondent would want to tell 
the crime boss what he wanted to hear. The circumstances at play left Mr. Hart with the choice of 
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confessing to Mr. Big or be deemed an untrusting liar by the very organization he wanted to join 
(R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 140).  
Given all these circumstances in light of the new rule and the overwhelming incentive to 
confess, with the lack of consistency and confirmatory evidence the Court found the reliability of 
Mr. Hart’s confessions in serious doubt in which the probative value of them was low (R v Hart, 
[2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 144).  In such situations, the crown would likely be unable to demonstrate 
the confession to be admissible, resulting in the remaining evidence surrounding the Mr. Big 
operation becoming irrelevant and thus inadmissible (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p.38). Mr. 
Hart’s confession should be excluded and ruled inadmissible, the justices also did not focus on 
the police misconduct specifically because they do not think the conduct amounted to an abuse 
of process; however, they acknowledge that behavior such as preying on the respondent’s status 
of poverty, his social isolation, and his poor health put the respondent a risk and warranted 
excluding the confessions (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 148). This SCC decision allowed for 
multiple factors to be considered within this new two-pronged test that supports the rights and 
freedoms of the accused, while adapting to the unique circumstances of these undercover 
operations. 
Legal Implications and Discussion 
 
The Mr. Big investigation is incredibly interesting for its complexity and use by Canadian 
police since the 1990s with claims of effectiveness for solving cold and unsolved cases (R v 
Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.56). This investigative technique is not used without criticism due to 
the secretive nature of this undercover operation and that police discretion is heavily relied on.  
Misconduct is often an issue at the forefront of these investigations as prejudice, unethical 
tactics, and the intrusion of an accused’s Charter rights may easily occur in such settings. The 
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concerns and criticisms of Mr. Big operations are crucial to examine and discuss as such 
instances can create Charter infringements of the accused’s rights. Principles of reliability and 
prejudice are fundamentally evidentiary issues. Canada being a free and democratic society with 
a constitutionally enshrined Charter must uphold the values and principles of fundamental 
justice.  
It cannot be denied that the Mr. Big technique has been beneficial to the Canadian justice 
system in collecting evidence and leading to solving many cases that would have otherwise gone 
cold. The search for truth is paramount to police investigations but the procedures being used 
must also be conducted in a manner that properly operates within the context of legislation and 
constitutional authorities, such as protecting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
respect to the ‘target’ (Poloz, 2015, p.235).  
There is a foundational need on the basis of the principles of justice for the courts to 
strive for an appropriate balance between crime control and the protection of society. 
Nonetheless, courts must also focus on the balance of providing fairness to the accused persons 
and preventing abuse of police powers on the other (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, p.295).  
Involuntary or False Confessions 
There are significant ethical and legal issues raised by Mr. Big operations. These concern 
the right to silence, applicability of law on the voluntariness of confessions, deciding if the 
tactics used during the investigation are tantamount to an abuse of process, if the admission from 
the accused is considered reliable, and the risk of a false confession (Keenan, 2010, p.65). To 
further explain, psychological science has also made it clear that in planning and conducting law 
enforcement interrogations, such as those conducted by Mr. Big in the final evidence gather 
stage, interviewers must be cognizant of and concerned about the risk of an accused’s memory 
distortion, possibility of a false confession and accurately interpreting the ‘deception’ (Porter, et 
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al., 2016, p.36). These characteristics could present themselves, become heightened, or be 
misinterpreted by officers given the context of the unique undercover operations. The occurrence 
of these risks could result in many involuntary confessions which would likely create unreliable 
evidence, if these issues commonly arise during these investigations, it reasonably could damage 
the effectiveness and legality of the operation. 
Undeniably, it is an advantageous opportunity in undercover policing for a probable 
suspect to be unaware that they are speaking to an officer or informant. This covert tactic has 
been proven to be reasonable; similar to probing, open ended questions, and other interrogation 
approaches. Although the argument with Mr. Big operations does not lie in the secretive or 
undercover nature but rather the influence of officer conduct, enticements, and the overall 
complete alteration of reality that may unfairly disadvantage the individual. As it is, ‘targets’ of 
Mr. Big operations are different at a foundational legal level as they miss out on many of the 
protections and familiarity that a standard custodial interrogation offers.  
Accusatory Interview Style 
To further explain the impact of interrogation style, using Canadian police interrogation 
transcripts, it has been shown that there is a clear presence of an accusatory interview style used 
among the RCMP and other Canadian police agencies. Research shows that fewer than 1% of the 
questions asked to a suspect during interrogations were open-ended, where 40% and 30% of the 
police questions asked were shown to be yes/no and probing questions (Porter, et al., 2016, 
p.37). Such questions even in “normal” interrogation settings demonstrate the police take 
advantage of tactics that could ultimately impact the truthfulness and the effectiveness of the 
evidence (Porter, et al., 2016, p.37). Canadian police will do so with accusatory strategies and 
approaches in which they confront the target with direct accusations, continuous probing, or 
verbal threats. This more aggressive approach is possible through the lack of oversight and 
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potentially poor officer discretion that could go beyond a reasonable threshold of tactics, 
subjecting the accused to unreasonable treatment or foster unreliable evidence. 
Aura of Violence 
The success of a Mr. Big operation often depends on the very environment and 
relationship to which the undercover operatives expose the target. This means that the 
investigation is perceived to create an aura of violence deliberately cultivated to reinforce the 
supposed organization’s values of honesty, trust, and loyalty (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 
59). These values can function as an inducement to confess as they are critically important to Mr. 
Big and impact the accused’s future “membership”. This aura can be seen through the simulated 
acts of violence that the operatives may involve the target in. These violent acts can influence a 
target’s perception of the situation and the reliability of their confession. For instance, many 
targets may confess in order to brag or impress Mr. Big, in doing so, they are seeking acceptance 
in which they may falsify the information presented (Sukkau, & Brockman, 2015, 70). However, 
the issue is not so black and white, police report that creating a coercive atmosphere during 
interviews has been useful in collecting information from a suspect as some pressure is necessary 
(Acheneftos, 2010, para.2). Loosely built off the principle of “bad cop, good cop”, the goal of an 
interviewee should be to approach the interview in such a way that the suspect would willingly 
volunteer a confession. This requires the police to balance the interests of their interrogation 
while protecting the individual from unreasonable intrusion. This is often easier said than done 
as evident in appeals to the SCC and the evolution of common law in addressing these unique 
interrogations (Acheneftos, 2010, para.6). For not only can the environment of non-custodial 
interrogations and the aura of violence impact an accused’s behavior and potentially reliability of 
their confession, but the tactics specifically used by operatives during the interrogation can 
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borderline an unreasonable degree of police trickery or engage the abuse of process doctrine in 
which directly engage the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Inducements for a False Confession 
In the addressing the possibility of false confessions under the operation of Mr. Big the 
possible suspect would become a “coerced-compliant”; an innocent individual who confesses “in 
exchange for a promised incentive, or to escape mistreatment by law enforcement all why 
knowing [they are] innocent (Porter, et al., 2016, p.37).  The promises of legal protection, 
monetary gains, friendship, a scapegoat, job, etc. that Mr. Big offers to the target could be 
interpreted as considerable incentives for an individual to confess. The potential for a false 
confession to occur can increase in proportion to the nature and the extent of the inducements 
being held out to the target (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 69). The danger of a false confession 
during a Mr. Big interview can pose a greater risk than custodial interrogations because of their 
emphasis on costs and benefits being significantly misrepresented to the suspect as their entire 
environment is altered (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.328). Furthermore, the target may even be told 
that Mr. Big has “conclusive evidence of their guilt”.  Denying the offense would just prove to 
Mr. Big that they lack trustworthiness and thus cannot join the organization they desperately 
want to be a member (R v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p. 60). This puts a different type of pressure 
on the accused to produce a statement.  
Psychological Stress 
The significant role of the intimidating environment perpetuated by Mr. Big during the 
meeting and the tactics employed during could make the suspect feel an unreasonable amount of 
psychological or physical stress. This calculated addition of stress in these circumstances begins 
to threaten the target’s right to security. As Keenan (2010) explains, self-incriminating 
statements alone are induced when life changing promises of wealth, professional advancement, 
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and the avoidance of penal sanction are being held, they may even mis portray themselves to 
show that they are a worthy candidate to Mr. Big (p.47). It is in these circumstances that one can 
begin to question if the investigation would undermine the reliability and value of the evidence, 
and potentially create further unnecessary risk of wrongful convictions.    
Police Officer Discretion 
In light of the significant role police discretion plays in conducting these investigations, it 
is conceivable that officers may struggle with bias toward labelling suspects as guilty and 
deceptive simply based on demeanor, behaviour, or questionable evidence, rather than remaining 
objective. The SCC recognized the “moral prejudice in these circumstances [to be] significant (R 
v Hart, [2014] 2 SCR 544, p.145). Given the extensive work and information building required 
from the undercover operatives, there is a greater sense of pressure on maintaining the 
presumption of the target’s innocence (Smith, et al., 2009, p.181).  However, if police are also 
investigating with the belief that the suspect is guilty of the offense, the balance of the interests 
between securing evidence for a conviction and the target’s legal rights may become a blurred 
line (Smith, et al., 2009, p.181). One of the largest criticisms of this technique is officers who 
hold a guilty-presumptive frame of mind which can negatively influence the operation and 
infringe the suspects s.11(d) Charter rights by not presuming them innocent until proven guilty in 
a court of law. With that being said, section 7 of the Charter is also engaged and is necessary to 
consider in determining if the target has a right to silence as protected by the common law and 
the Charter in these investigations. 
Engagement of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
The Charter’s section 7 principles against self-incrimination and the rule of law are two 
fundamental organizing values of the Charter that are relevant to Mr. Big investigations (Keenan 
et al., 2010, p.32). Section 7 of the Charter established the legal protections that are afforded to 
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everyone are intended to put reasonable limits on police conduct. In Mr. Big operations, a section 
7 infringement can occur as a result of the officers depriving the target of their right to life, 
liberty, and security. This can happen through coercing confessions, entrapment, or using unjust 
tactics that do not respect the right to silence. This potential infringing behavior or tactics 
alongside the principles of section 7 of the Charter have been discussed at length earlier. It is also 
crucial to understand the moment in which these protections are engaged in Mr. Big operations 
to fully understand the influence the Charter has on Mr. Big operations in its role to ensure a fair 
and reliable investigation to ensure a fair administration of justice.  
As seen in the confession rule, the right to silence applies any time a person interacts with 
a person of authority regardless of if they are detained or not. This allows an individual to 
exercise their personal freedom in choosing the extent to which they cooperate with police. The 
SCC has furthered this principle through new common law which established a recognition of 
the potential for coercive impacts from state authorities and the risk of individuals incriminating 
themselves (Keenan, 2010, p.65). As identified in section 7, the principle of moral 
blameworthiness requires evidence of the accused before holding them criminally responsible as 
this can lead to wrongful convictions (Barnhorst, & Barnhorst, 2013, p.48). This ability to 
produce evidence of moral blameworthiness in Mr. Big operations is a complex task in which the 
law enforcement methods could bring about inaccurate, coerced, or unreasonable evidence which 
brings the effectiveness and the ethics of this approach into question.  
Furthermore, these Mr. Big operations do not usually have control over a target’s 
movements. Depriving the target of their section 7 right to silence could occur by law 
enforcement by engaging in the various SCC explained abusive practices and behaviors that 
intrude on the individual’s ability to exercise their operating mind (Sharpe, & Roach, 2017, 
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p.107). Such illegal tactics can threaten the liberty and security of the person and would not 
uphold the principles of fundamental justice, rendering any confessional evidence collected to be 
subjected a test of admissibility. To make a confession admissible when it does not pass the 
section 7 test would bring the principles of fundamental justice into disrepute. With that being 
said, under the new common law rule developed by the SCC, confessions obtained in the course 
of Mr. Big operations are to be presumptively inadmissible due to the very nature of the 
investigation and the risks associated. This is not to say the confessions cannot be admitted, but 
the Crown must establish using a balance of probability that the probative value of the 
confessions should outweigh its prejudicial effect.  
This approach supports the section 11 right that emphasizes the plausibility of an accused 
to make a self-incriminating statement to an undercover officer. Some researchers argue that 
these statements should be excluded entirely because they were admissions made simply as a 
result of the circumstances of implied threats, psychological manipulation, and/or significant 
inducements held out by what the accused would have perceived as a person of authority in this 
criminal syndicate.  
The alteration of reality unconsciously shapes the accused’s behavior and perception, 
creating an opportunity for law enforcement officers to engage but also fosters unreliability due 
to ‘set up’. These Mr. Big operations place a type of psychological control on the target as they 
are socialized into a life of crime and degradation which can become a powerful force in 
inducing false confessions and controlling the individual (Keenan, 2010, p.68). Undercover 
operatives are considered bypassing a suspect’s right to silence when they persistently continue 
talking to the suspect, or if a confession is coerced. The right to silence would become infringed 
when police operatives go astray from the directed control and tactics that are deemed within 
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reason. Canadian’s value and live in a free and democratic society where anyone is free to 
remain silent in the face of police questioning and should not feel compelled or left with no other 
choice but to confess (Keenan, 2010, p.32). In circumstances where the target is unaware of the 
authority or that they are undergoing a form of police questioning, the values and principles of 
section 7 must be upheld to protect the accused against self-incrimination or making a false 
confession.  
Section 11 and the presumption of innocence is a requirement in law to be fair and 
interacts with the idea that Mr. Big operations target a suspect based on a suspicion of guilt. In 
the pursuit of a confession where law enforcement believes the target is guilty, there is 
opportunity for bias, pressure, and prejudices to interfere which can negatively impact state 
discretion in which s.11(d) could be violated in their pursuit of a confession. This can possibly 
happen as law enforcement may dismiss that the person is innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt in court. This can happen because the police feel that the evidence, their 
intuition or other factors lead to different conclusions (Department of Justice, 2019, para. 4). 
Officers have both a common law and statutory duty to investigate crime and should be given all 
the necessary skills and tools to be able to uphold that duty. Nonetheless, they are not provided 
special authority above the law. They may reasonably exercise any authority given to them by 
the state. However, an officer is relied on to exercise their own discretion in exercising their 
authority. It is in this discretional conduct that the Charter applies to and where infringements 
can easily occur (Stewart, 2012, p.37). If law enforcement strictly follows methods of 
intelligence-gathering or ‘truth-seeking agenda’ that is taught and enforced by trained 
psychologists, they would intuitively advise against using any physical or extreme psychological 
coercion that we see commonly occurring in Mr. Big operations (Porter, Rose, & Dilley, 2016, 
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p.36). Thus, police should be extra to these risks as it has been shown “predominantly generate 
misinformation” (Porter, et al., 2016, p.36).  
This discussion is not to give the impression that Canadian police are consistently 
engaging in unethical practices, or that the Mr. Big investigative technique is ‘bad’. Rather, the 
challenges to the admissibility of Mr. Big confessions have commonly been dismissed in the 
courts, only occasionally have the courts or precedent shown to express reservations about the 
technique (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.327). Although, there have been further advances by the 
SCC to encourage the Canadian police to transition to a nondeceptive, information-gathering 
model of police interrogation practice (PEACE) (Porter, et al., 2016, p.40). This represents the 
process and traits of preparation, planning, engagement, explanation, account, closure, and 
evaluation which has alienated some of the ethical stress that was previously ensuing in 
interrogations (Porter, et al., 2016, p.40).  
However, some research suggests that even further and higher standards for Mr. Big 
operations are necessary due to their realistic and significant potential of these investigations to 
produce unreliable or false confessions that would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.322). Other researchers have suggested that further 
safeguards of Mr. Big operations should consist of requiring the operations to be judicially 
preapproved. Further, Mr. Big operations should be corroborated by significant additional 
evidence where police should make their awareness and perceptiveness to the risk of infringing 
rights of the accused a primary concern (Sukkau, & Brockman, 2015, p. 76).  Since the landmark 
case of R v Hart [2014], significant concerns have been addressed and further guidance has been 
given in regard to these unique undercover investigations. Nonetheless, there is still further 
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clarity needed on the issue of how reliable or truthful a confession may be at its core, regardless 
of the court’s determinations of admissibility.  
Recommendations and Conclusion 
Despite the safeguards Canadian police and courts have put in place, there is still the fact 
that there is a substantial degree of unreliability of self-incriminating statements that are being 
obtained through Mr. Big operations. This unreliability is found when a target may confess to a 
crime he or she did not commit or was unreasonably induced into making a statement, thus 
creating room for false confessions leading to wrongful convictions that ultimately undermined 
the due process of the Canadian criminal justice system. It is clear that there is value in 
undercover investigations and that Mr. Big operations have been able to successfully solve many 
crimes in Canada. However, an individual’s rights cannot be compromised in this pursuit, 
especially because it can pose a significant risk for wrongful convictions or Charter 
infringements of the suspect. Mr. Big Operations raise concerns about its sometimes-oppressive 
tactics and conduct. Within this context, the SCC has deemed legal prejudice, reliability of 
confessions, and police misconduct as primary areas of concern (Murphy, & Anderson, 2016, p. 
47). Police misconduct in general has been addressed more recently, but still requires further 
common law limitation and refinement of conduct and duty. Pertaining to officer discretion in 
the advancement of Mr. Big operations, it is important to realize there is a crucial difference 
between law enforcement using character traits or situational opportunities to investigate and 
develop a rapport with someone and using tactics that coerce or prey on the target’s 




To further advance the protection of individual rights and freedoms in light of undercover 
operations, Canadian courts should continue to take steps in creating common law rules for the 
collection of evidence (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.335). Given the widespread movements 
demanding police accountability such as Black Lives Matter (BLM) and the negative climate 
surrounding law enforcement today such as #Defund the police, it is no secret that police 
misconduct is an ongoing concern. It is evident that this misconduct is more likely to occur 
‘behind the scenes’ where the public is unable to hold law enforcement accountable. This would 
mimic the structure and environment of Mr. Big operations where it is reasonable to consider 
that the secretive strategically complex technique would create a similar breeding ground for 
misconduct.  
Encouraging alternative approaches of legislative reform or legislative actions in the courts in the 
face of such controversial and risky tactics could further address and control the problems related 
to police misconduct we see today and aid in bringing back legitimacy and accountability to the 
public-police relationship (Hunt, & Rankin, 2014, p.335). This is to say that due to the very 
nature of the Mr. Big technique, it is predisposed to serious and sensitive issues that are readily 
available for the courts to scrutinize. It is also fair to ask the courts to create such a limitation 
protection through the establishment of a specific rule, as seen in R v Hart to help secure the 
limitations of law enforcement and an accused’s Charter rights (Murphy, &Anderson, 2016, 
p.47).  
Recommendation Two 
Legal rights in the Canadian Charter, specifically section 7 and section 11(d), interact 
with particular concepts of this investigation technique that truly call into question the 
seriousness of these risks that may interfere with a fair process of justice. It is therefore 
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important that police agencies establish guidelines to ensure that Mr. Big operations do not 
inadvertently infringe on a target’s Charter rights. A target is afforded the right to silence and the 
right to security of the person, along with the presumption of innocence, any police tactics or 
conduct that would encroach on the Charter values such as autonomy, privacy, fairness, etc. that 
would disadvantage the target. Since the Charter is the supreme law of Canada, citizens are 
afforded the rights, freedoms, and protections under the Constitution. There must only be 
specific circumstances for any infringements to be justified.  Infringements that likely cannot be 
justified under the circumstance of a Mr. Big investigation. Therefore, if undercover operatives 
are using harmful tactics, it places substantial pressure on the individual to the point it engages 
the Charter and could potentially constitute an unjustifiable Charter infringement. Thus, bringing 
the effective purpose and constitutionality of this technique into debate (Moore, et al., 2009, 
p.371).  
Recommendation Three 
In Canada. it is not unheard of to see offenders and the accused exonerated based on 
DNA evidence being retested years after a person has confessed (Moore, et al., 2009, p.400). 
This fact demonstrates that the possibly of false confessions and a miscarriage of justice is a 
legitimate plausible outcome to consider (Moore, et al., 2009, p.400). The personal, physical, and 
mental characteristics of the target of a Mr. Big investigation need to be considered throughout 
the investigation as their own perception and cognitive functioning will impact how police 
tactics are received. This further emphasizes the need for the Canadian justice system to 
distinguish all the methods of interrogations that are approved, and to place reasonable 
limitations on police conduct. With an explicit direction from SCC or legislation, it would reduce 
or eliminate the investigations reliance on false evidence or feeling the need to resort to police 
trickery and intruding tactics in order to “solve” the crime (Moore, et al., 2009, p.400). With that 
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being said, alternative extensive measures may involve videotaping the interrogations through 
body cameras or alternative technology which would change the reliability of the investigation 
for the better due to the availability of alternative physical evidence (Moore, et al., 2009, p.400).  
Recommendation Four 
Further safeguards such as more stringent procedures for evaluating evidence and 
sufficient consideration of vulnerable and high-risk populations are needed in Mr. Big operations 
(Smith, et al., 2009, p187). As law is always adapting and evolving, the new evidentiary rule put 
forth in R v Hart [2014] created the understanding around the limitation of Mr. Big operations 
and the link to Charter rights. Some criticize the SCC as they argue this approach would be better 
with a more “generally articulated” rule of evidence at a higher level that could have applied to 
all undercover investigations that occur rather than just Mr. Big operations specifically (Hunt, & 
Rankin, 2014, p.334). However, due to unique circumstances of the R v Hart [2014] case, and 
the characteristics of these operations as a whole, the Court did a positive job in clarifying 
section 7 and protecting individual rights. By determining all Mr. Big confessions are to be 
considered inadmissible until the Crown can demonstrate the accurate balance of probabilities 
and can weigh the probative and prejudicial value of the evidence, this ensures a target will be 
given a fair trial and the resulting confession would be reliable (Puddister et al, 2012, p.400). 
Recommendation Five 
To help further refine Mr. Big operations and ensure the protection of Charter rights, 
Parliament should put forth legislative guidelines to address all undercover operations along with 
the SCC common law. This does not have to be complicated but secured guidelines as simple as 
instructing judges to carefully consider the reliability of evidence by examining the presence of 
inducements or threats made by police undercover operatives would make a considerable 
difference (Puddister, et al., 2012, p.401). Some even suggest that police should provide “the 
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provincial solicitor general or minister of public safety with reports that evaluate the costs and 
benefits of the technique” so that there is a way to keep record and measure its effectiveness and 
use (Puddister, et al., 2012, p.401). It is important to note in this argument that there have not 
been many known cases where a wrongful conviction occurred from the use of a Mr. Big 
operation. However, there have been Mr. Big cases where confessional or forensic evidence that 
was used has been re-called into question in which trials have been thrown out, or instances of 
false confessions have occurred (R v Hart, 2014, 2 SCR 544, p. 62).  
There is considerable value in Mr. Big operations.  It is a complex and well-established 
technique that has advanced undercover policing and has become what the Canadian police call 
“effective” and “successful” in convicting criminals. Although, given the evidence of the 
plausible risks associated with the Mr. Big operations, there is reasonable need for concern in 
which legislative guidelines and further common law precedent should establish further 
thresholds and limitations. In Canada, the police should also continue to work to improve 
training with respect to undercover operations to raise awareness and sensitivity of psychological 
dimensions involved in false confessions and the risks involved in these investigations 
(Puddister, et al., 2012, p.402). Although a valuable investigative technique, Mr. Big operations 
require oversight and further judicial guidance. Mr. Big operations are a borderline Charter 
infringing technique and need to be used carefully. The operation itself may not infringe an 
individual’s Charter rights directly, however, the very nature of the operation exposes the 
accused to unique circumstances with an increased risk of opportunity for injustice. Any police 
conduct that engages the Charter in a way that threatens a target’s rights should be examined 
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